G. W. F. Hegel

German philosopher (1770–1831). Author of the Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807; ingested as hegel-1807-phenomenology-spirit), the Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-16, with the Doctrine of Being revised 1831-32; all three volumes now ingested — GW 21 (revised Sein, 1832), GW 11 (original Sein 1812 + Doctrine of Essence 1813), GW 12 (Subjective Logic / Doctrine of the Concept, 1816)), the Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817/1827/1830, not yet ingested), and lectures on Geschichte der Philosophie, Aesthetik, Religionsphilosophie, and Geschichte. As of the 2026-05-21 Wissenschaft der Logik three-volume ingest, the wiki has primary-source coverage of Hegel's two completed major works (Phenomenology + WdL) — anchoring claims that previously routed only through Heidegger 1964, MP 1946 / 1955 / 1960-61, Chouraqui's reception, and Pinkard's monograph.

The wiki tracks Hegel principally as (i) the central figure of the post-Kantian Jena ferment whose Phenomenology (1807) attempts to make philosophy Wissenschaft without Schellingian intellectual intuition or Reinholdian foundationalism; (ii) one of the two modern philosophers (with Husserl) read by Heidegger in the 1964 essay under the rubric of the call "zur Sache selbst"; (iii) the principal historical referent for Merleau-Ponty's 1960-61 course "Philosophy and Nonphilosophy since Hegel"; and (iv) a Vollendung-relevant figure across Heidegger's corpus — the Hegelian system and absolute knowing are read as a moment of philosophy's Vollendung (per vollendung-der-metaphysik). Hegel's Wahrheit des Seins in the Logic receives a specific late-Heidegger gloss in the 1964 essay (GA 14 p. 86, citing the Logic explicitly); §798 of the Phenomenology is the wiki's interpretive extension of this diagnostic to the 1807 text (live claim, see claims#hegel-798-anchors-heidegger-1964-aletheia-diagnostic).

Key Points

  • The 1807 Phänomenologie Vorrede call "zur Sache selbst". In Hegel's "Vorrede" to the Phänomenologie des Geistes (Pinkard 2018 §3, raw line 551; Hoffmeister edition p. 19), Hegel demands that thinking dwell on the matter and forget itself in it. Primary-source anchors (hegel-1807-phenomenology-spirit): Preface footnote 1 (line 531), §3 (line 551), §4 footnote 7 (line 559) "die Erfahrung der Sache selbst", §53 (line 806) "give itself over to the life of the object"; Reason §417 (line 2714) climaxes "the doing of each and all, the essence that is the essence of all essence" — the dialectical maturation of the formula. For Heidegger 1964, this call rejects two inadequate relations to philosophy's matter: bare Reden über den Zweck der Philosophie and bare Berichten über die Resultate des philosophischen Denkens. The whole shows itself only in its Werden; in the Darstellung, theme and method become identical (= der Gedanke). The matter of philosophy comes forth "selbst" through the speculative-dialectical movement. See sache-selbst for the primary-source-anchored concept page.
  • The matter for Hegel: Subjektivität / substance becoming subject. The matter the call summons is for Hegel historically determined — die Subjektivität (subjectivity), inherited via Descartes' ego cogito as ausgezeichnetes subiectum. Hegel's central thesis (Preface §17, raw line 621): "everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject." For Heidegger, this means: the Sein des Seienden, die Anwesenheit des Anwesenden is for Hegel vollständige Anwesenheit only when it becomes for-itself in the absolute Idee. Method = the Gedanke = the matter itself. The thesis is polemically triangulated against Spinoza (one-substance), Fichte (thinking-as-thinking), and Schelling (intellectual intuition) — see hegel-1807-phenomenology-spirit Core Argument 1.
  • Recognition (Anerkennung) as the structural condition of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness requires another self-consciousness; "I that is We, We that is I" — Geist's first appearance at Self-Consciousness ¶177 (raw line 1469). The asymmetric form is master/slave (¶¶187–196); the mature form is the reconciling Yes of Spirit C §671 (raw line 4080): "a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit." See master-slave-dialectic and recognition-and-institution.
  • Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and Antigone. Spirit VI Section A (§§438–482) treats Sittlichkeit as the immediate substantial form of spirit, with Antigone (§469 the only explicit naming) as its structural figure: ethical action is constitutively guilty because each side has its own legitimacy. See sittlichkeit and antigone-hegel.
  • The Terror as the structural consequence of absolute freedom. Spirit VI Section B (§§582–595) traces the French Revolution's transition into the Terror; "the sole work and deed of universal freedom is in fact death" (¶590). Philological source for MP 1947 *Humanism and Terror*.
  • The speculative Good Friday. Religion VII §785 (raw line ~4585): "God himself is dead" — but the death is spirit-giving, not loss. The death of mediator simultaneously kills the abstraction of divine essence; substance becomes subject. Philological source for the entire 19c death-of-God thematic. See speculative-good-friday.
  • Speculative dialectic as the form of Scheinen. Hegel's dialectic operates within the Lichtung but does not think the Lichtung. See §"Speculative Dialectic as the Form of Scheinen."
  • Hegel and the Wahrheit des Seins. Heidegger 1964 (GA 14 p. 86) cites Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik for Wahrheit-als-Gewißheit. §798 of the Phenomenology (raw line 4741) — "the truth that has the shape of certainty" — is the Phenomenology's own concentration of this formulation; the cross-source link is the wiki's interpretive extension, not a Heidegger citation (live claim, see claims#hegel-798-anchors-heidegger-1964-aletheia-diagnostic). See absolute-knowing and §"Hegel and the Wahrheit des Seins."
  • The 1831 retrospective self-correction. Hegel's handwritten note for a planned second edition (raw line 4885): "the abstract absolute prevailed at that time." Primary-source anchor for two-hegels-1807-1827.
  • What Hegel does not ask: "Aber Hegel fragt auch nicht, sowenig wie Husserl, sowenig wie alle Metaphysik nach dem Sein als Sein, d. h. die Frage, inwiefern es Anwesenheit als solche geben kann" (GA 14 p. 86-87). Hegel does not ask about Sein als Sein, i.e., whether Anwesenheit als solche can give itself. Marginal (27): the question Hegel does not ask is "inwiefern es die ontologische Differenz gibt und geben kann."

The "Night in Which All Cows Are Black" Caricature, Decisively Refuted by Schelling's 1809 Ungrund (added 2026-05-23)

The 2026-05-23 ingest of Schelling's 1809 *Freedom Essay* establishes that Hegel's famous "night in which all cows are black" caricature of Schelling's identity-philosophy Indifferenz (Phenomenology of Spirit Preface §16) is demonstrably wrong as applied to the 1809 Ungrund. Schelling preempts the caricature inside his own text, and the editors' note 95 to the Freedom Essay (raw line ~1808) makes the contrast explicit.

Schelling's 1809 Ungrund-as-Indifferenz is:

  • Not the identity of opposites (which would presuppose the opposites inside the prior unity)
  • Not the empty absolute Hegel mocked
  • Is "a point of indifference between oppositions where they are in balance, where they are indifferent the one to the other" — i.e., a relation between differences, not their absence
  • Posits the duality through self-division "Duality breaks forth therefore immediately from the Neither-Nor"

The wiki's existing "Hegel's WdL Polemic Against 'Modern Construiren'" section on the Schelling entity page correctly identifies the GW 12 p. 254 polemic as targeting the method (construction, intellectual intuition) of identity-philosophy. The genuine Hegel-Schelling dispute on the absolute is over the adequacy of indifference as starting-point, not over the content of indifference (which Hegel caricatured). This is a different and more interesting dispute than the standard reception suggests.

See ungrund §"The Hegelian caricature, decisively refuted" for the primary-text articulation; see claims#schelling-ungrund-as-indifference-decisively-refutes-hegelian-night-caricature (candidate, 2026-05-23) for the formal corrective claim.

Hegel in MP's Sense and Non-Sense (1946): the existentialist Hegel

*Sense and Non-Sense*'s "Hegel's Existentialism" (Chapter 5; Les Temps modernes No. 7, April 1946) is MP's most compressed published statement on Hegel — and the text where MP's two-Hegels distinction is introduced. Tracking Hyppolite's 1946 Genèse et structure de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit, MP develops three load-bearing claims:

  1. There are two Hegels — the Hegel of 1807 (Phänomenologie) and the Hegel of 1827 (Encyclopädie / Philosophy of Right) — and "the real debate between Marx and Hegel" is not idea-vs-history but culminating-vs-open history (p. 65). The 1807 Hegel describes consciousness's Unruhe without claiming the philosopher's vantage; the 1827 Hegel "has understood everything except his own historical situation."

  2. Consciousness of life is consciousness of death: for there to be consciousness of life, "an absence of being [must come] into the world." MP cites Hegel's Realphilosophie via Hoffmeister: "Man is the sick animal" (p. 66). Even Nazi ideology can only function by borrowing from this consciousness of death and then obscuring it. See consciousness-of-life-as-consciousness-of-death.

  3. The slave, not the master, has the most exact awareness of the human situation (pp. 67-68). The master "pretends ignorance of the foundation of being and communication"; he is "weak in his strength." The slave has been afraid, has chosen to live, "knows better than the master what death means."

MP's structural disagreement with Hyppolite: Hyppolite says Hegel "stops being an existentialist" with the move from individual to history; MP holds that the move to history is the affirmation of the individual properly understood (because the for-others is internal to consciousness). MP's 1946 reading therefore preserves more of Hegel's project than Hyppolite's — and prepares the way for AdV-1955's reading of Hegel through Marx and Lukács.

The 1945-46 "date of the revolution is written on no wall and in no metaphysical heaven" doctrine (Battle over Existentialism p. 78) is the explicit political extension: a Hegel without the Absolute, a dialectic without guarantee. See pente-de-l-histoire and two-hegels-1807-1827 for the full development.

Hegel in MP's Possibility of Philosophy (1959-61)

Merleau-Ponty's 1960-61 course "Philosophy and Nonphilosophy since Hegel" treats Hegel as the historical hinge between classical philosophy and the post-Hegelian crisis. Course 3 develops Hegel and Marx; Heidegger is announced but the lectures stop with Marx. The Hegel of Course 3 is the Hegel for whom philosophy is its own history — the system that absorbs and recapitulates its own past. MP's reading partly accepts and partly contests Heidegger's Vollendung-frame: truth as cumulative-systematic recapitulation is what philosophy can no longer do after Hegel; philosophy and nonphilosophy names the post-Hegelian crisis.

The buried tension between MP and Heidegger lives partly here. MP follows Heidegger in rejecting progress-and-decadence narratives; he refuses Heidegger's destinal frame; he wants the historicality of philosophy anchored in the present. Hegel is the figure on whom both readings turn: for Heidegger, Hegel is the speculative-dialectical Vollendung of metaphysics-as-Subjektivität; for MP, Hegel is the figure who first thinks the relation of philosophy to its own history but then closes it in absolute knowing. See seinsgeschichte §"The Buried Tension" and mp-1959-1961-seinsgeschichte-reversal.

Hegel's Place in the Vollendung (Heidegger Side)

For Heidegger, Hegel is not the letzter Metaphysiker — that role belongs to Nietzsche, on the reading of *Nietzsche I*. Hegel is one moment of the metaphysical Vollendung, alongside Nietzsche, Marx, Husserl, etc. The 1964 essay collapses the methodological difference between Hegel and Husserl in favor of their shared presupposition of subjectivity-as-Sache: "Beide Methoden sind so verschieden als nur möglich. Die Sache als solche aber, die sie darstellen sollen, ist dieselbe, wenngleich sie auf verschiedene Weise erfahren wird" (GA 14 p. 78).

Cross-corpus pointer: Hegel und die Griechen (1958, GA 9 pp. 427-444; Wegmarken pp. 270ff.) is Heidegger's most concentrated Auseinandersetzung with Hegel as Greek thinker. Marginal (10) at GA 14 p. 80 cross-references this. Unconsulted on this ingest.

Speculative Dialectic as the Form of Scheinen

For Heidegger 1964, Hegel's speculative dialectic is eine Weise, wie die Sache der Philosophie aus sich selbst für sich selbst zum Scheinen kommt und so Gegenwart wird — a way in which philosophy's matter comes from itself, for itself, into shining-forth and so into presence. The dialectical Bewegung des Gedankens is therefore a Scheinen. But any Scheinen presupposes the Lichtung (clearing): a shining-forth requires a Helle (brightness), and the Helle requires the open Freie in which it can play. Hegel's dialectic operates within the Lichtung but does not think the Lichtung as such. The cardinal passage at GA 14 p. 80: Auch wo bei Hegel spekulativ eines im anderen sich spiegelt, da waltet schon Offenheit, ist freie Gegend im Spiel. The speculative mirror-play presupposes an open region the speculative method does not thematize.

Hegel and the Wahrheit des Seins

The phrase "Wahrheit des Seins" (truth of Being) in Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik receives a specific late-Heidegger reading at GA 14 p. 86: it has its berechtigten Sinn (legitimate sense) in Hegel "weil Wahrheit hier die Gewißheit des absoluten Wissens bedeutet" — because Wahrheit here means the certainty of absolute knowing. Marginal (26) sharpens this: "besser: weil die Gewißheit eine Abwandlung der überlieferten Bestimmung der Wahrheit darstellt" — better: because Gewißheit is a modification of the inherited determination of truth. Hegel's "truth of Being" is therefore Wahrheit-as-certainty, an inherited form of Wahrheit, not the Aletheia-as-Lichtung the 1964 essay names. The diagnostic places Hegel's Wahrheit des Seins on the grounded side of the 1964 distinction: Aletheia grants the possibility of any Wahrheit, including Hegel's certainty-of-absolute-knowing. (See aletheia §"The 1964 Self-Correction" for the matching diagnostic from the Aletheia side.)

What Hegel Does Not Ask (Per Heidegger 1964)

Three negative diagnostics:

  1. Hegel does not ask about Sein als Sein. Sein for Hegel is Anwesenheit-as-substantiality-and-subjectivity; the question of whether Anwesenheit-als-solche can give itself at all is not Hegel's question. Marginal (27) reformulates: Hegel does not ask "inwiefern es die ontologische Differenz gibt und geben kann."
  2. Hegel does not think the Lichtung als solche. Hegel's speculative dialectic operates within the Lichtung — every dialectical Bewegung presupposes a Helle in which the matter shines forth, and the Helle presupposes the open Freie — but Hegel does not attend to the Lichtung. Die Philosophie spricht zwar vom Licht der Vernunft, aber achtet nicht auf die Lichtung des Seins (GA 14 p. 82).
  3. Hegel does not distinguish Wahrheit from Aletheia*. Hegel's "Wahrheit des Seins" is certainty of absolute knowing — the most refined form of Wahrheit-as-correspondence/certainty. The 1964 essay says Aletheia grants the possibility of Wahrheit; Aletheia is not Wahrheit. Hegel's Wahrheit des Seins therefore belongs to the grounded register, not to the grounding register Aletheia names. (See aletheia §"The 1964 Self-Correction.")

Connections

  • is one of the two modern voices of the call "zur Sache selbst" in heidegger-1964-end-of-philosophy §2 — together with Husserl. Both presuppose Subjektivität as Sache; both differ only in method (speculative dialectic vs. intentional intuition).
  • is the central figure of *Possibility of Philosophy* Course 3 (1960-61) — "Philosophy and Nonphilosophy since Hegel."
  • operates within but does not think Lichtung — see this page §"Speculative Dialectic as the Form of Scheinen."
  • does not distinguish Aletheia from Wahrheit — see this page §"Hegel and the Wahrheit des Seins." Marginal (26) at GA 14 p. 87.
  • does not ask the question of the *Herkunft* of the ontological difference — see this page §"What Hegel Does Not Ask"; per marginal (27) at GA 14 p. 87.
  • is one moment of vollendung-der-metaphysik — alongside Nietzsche, Marx, Husserl. Hegel is not the letzter Metaphysiker but is part of the Vollendung-trajectory.
  • is the structural opposite of parmenides — Parmenides names what Hegel does not think (Aletheia-as-Lichtung); Hegel completes what Parmenides did not begin (the speculative-dialectical Vollendung of metaphysics-as-Subjektivität).
  • prior subject of Auseinandersetzung in heidegger-1964-end-of-philosophy — see auseinandersetzung §"The 1964 Reflexive Auseinandersetzung."
  • is the locus of MP's "philosophy and nonphilosophy" diagnostic — see nonphilosophy for the MP-side.
  • contrasts with MP's Adventures of the Dialectic (1955) — MP's reading of Hegel through Marx and Lukács. Cross-MP source.
  • is the indispensable-but-resisted interlocutor of Gadamer — *Truth and Method* preserves Hegel's dialectic of experience (*Erfahrung*) but refuses its terminus in absolute knowledge, grounding hermeneutics in finitude instead (a candidate genealogical claim).

Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik (2026-05-21 ingest)

The three WdL volumes — ingested together on 2026-05-21 — anchor distinct sections of Hegel's logical corpus and have different textual statuses:

  • GW 21 — Doctrine of Being (revised 1832): the only section Hegel substantially revised between 1812 and his 1831 death. The revised Sein-book contains the famous opening triad (Sein / Nichts / Werden), Daseyn and the determinacy quartet, bad vs. true infinity, Quantität, Maß and the Knotenlinie, plus the Vorrede zur zweyten Ausgabe (7 November 1831) which contains the locus classicus of the *Aufheben* doctrine and the speculativer Geist der Sprache claim. The 1832 revision sharpens the polemic against Kant's three-term schema and elevates the German lexicalization of speculative structure as a methodological principle.

  • GW 11 — Objective Logic (1812/1813): contains the original 1812 Doctrine of Being (superseded by GW 21) AND the uniquely canonical 1813 Doctrine of Wesen — the only authoritative text on Reflexion, Schein, the four reflexionsbestimmungen (Identität / Verschiedenheit / Gegensatz / Widerspruch), Grund, Erscheinung, wirklichkeit, and the closing Substanz-Causalität-Wechselwirkung triad that transitions into the Begriff. GW 11 also contains Hegel's most-extended Spinoza-Anmerkung (raw 5951) — the corpus locus classicus for baruch-spinoza. The 1813 Wesen explicitly cross-references Phänomenologie p. 96 at raw 5625 (the verkehrte Welt footnote) — Hegel's own philological bridge from the 1813 Logic to the 1807 Phenomenology, complicating the two-hegels-1807-1827 framing.

  • GW 12 — Subjective Logic / Doctrine of the Concept (1816): the architectonic culmination, containing the *Begriff* as central category, the Allgemein / Besonderes / Einzelnes development, the four-type judgment ladder (the unendliches Urtheil with the crime example at p. 77), the syllogism architecture ("everything rational is a syllogism"), Objectivity (Mechanismus / Chemismus / Teleologie with the *List der Vernunft* and the plough is more honourable formula at p. 173), the Idea (Leben / Erkennen / absolute Idee), the Schmerz als Vorrecht des Lebendigen doctrine (p. 194), and the closing *freie Entlassung* into Nature (p. 253). The political-mechanism analogy at p. 152 (government / citizens / needs as three syllogistic terms) is a single attestation but pre-figures the Philosophy of Right.

The three volumes together establish the wiki's Wahrheit des Seins axis with Heidegger 1964 (GA 14 pp. 86–87): Heidegger's diagnosis that Hegel's "Wahrheit des Seins" in the WdL is Wahrheit-als-Gewißheit (certainty of absolute knowing) now has direct primary-source anchoring. The freie Entlassung into Nature is the structural seam at which Heidegger reads the Vollendung-der-Metaphysik completing itself.

The Hegel-Heidegger Two-Point Disanalogy (Protokoll pp. 58–60)

The Todtnauberg Protokoll Sessions 5–6 (GA 14 pp. 58–60, 64) articulate the two cardinal points where Hegel and Heidegger are structurally incommensurable:

  1. Sein-Denken-Identität-as-Gleichsetzung vs. Zusammengehören-im-Ereignis. For Hegel, the identity of thinking and Being is a Gleichsetzung — the speculative-dialectical movement in which each determines itself through the other and the result is the absolute Idea. For Heidegger, the "identity" is a Zusammengehören granted by the Ereignis: thinking and Being belong-together not because they are speculatively identical but because the Ereignis ereignet both. The Protokoll formulation (p. 55): the Hegelian Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Denken operates within the metaphysical Gleichsetzung-form; the Heideggerian version re-thinks belonging-together from the Ereignis, where identity is an Eigentum (owned-ness), not a dialectical Vermittlung.

  2. Aufhebung-der-Endlichkeit vs. Endlichkeit-im-Eigentum. For Hegel, the dialectical movement sublates (aufhebt) finitude: the finite is the moment through which the infinite actualizes itself; finitude is overcome in the absolute. For Heidegger, finitude belongs to the Ereignis itself — nicht nur die des Menschen, sondern die des Ereignisses selbst (p. 64). The new Endlichkeit-Begriff is: Endlichkeit, Ende, Grenze, das Eigene — ins Eigene Geborgensein. Heidegger's finitude is not sublated but sheltered-in-its-own. This is the deepest structural disanalogy: Hegel's system requires the Aufhebung of finitude into infinity; Heidegger's late thinking preserves finitude as the Ereignis's Eigentum.

The two-point disanalogy bears on the wiki's aufheben page (the structural difference between Hegelian Aufhebung and Heideggerian Schritt zurück) and on ereignis §"Connections" (the Endlichkeit-des-Ereignisses-selbst entry). It also grounds the broader wiki diagnostic: Hegel-Heidegger comparisons that treat the two as doing "the same thing differently" understate the structural incommensurability the Protokoll names.

Open Questions

  • Does the wiki's current treatment of Hegel underweight him relative to the role Heidegger and MP both assign him? Largely resolved by the 2026-05-18 Phenomenology ingest and the 2026-05-21 Wissenschaft der Logik three-volume ingest. Hegel now has the two completed major works anchored as primary sources.
  • What is the relation between Heidegger's Hegel und die Griechen (1958) and the 1964 essay's reading of Hegel? Marginal (10) at GA 14 p. 80 cross-references Hegel und die Griechen on the Lichtung-question; the differential treatment is unconsulted.
  • Is MP's hyper-dialectic a corrective to Hegel or an Auseinandersetzung with him? MP's hyper-dialectic page describes "dialectic without synthesis"; the 2026-05-21 WdL ingest now anchors what synthesis means for Hegel (aufheben structurally distinct from Fichtean Synthese; the closing freie-entlassung non-transition) — making MP's "dialectic without synthesis" more precisely formulable. Future audit could re-examine MP's critique against the WdL anchors.
  • Does MP's "the slave knows better than the master what death means" anchor in a verbatim Hegel passage, or in Kojève's mediation? The closest textual anchors are Phenomenology ¶194 ("fear of death, the absolute master") and ¶193 ("servile consciousness as the truth"), but MP's exact phrasing does not appear in Hegel. Audit candidate.
  • Three-Hegels rather than two? The two-hegels-1807-1827 distinction (1807 Phänomenologie vs. 1827 Encyclopädie / Philosophy of Right) is now complicated by the 1832 GW 21 revision: Hegel rewrote the Doctrine of Being substantially between 1812 and 1831, and the 1831 marginal note for a planned Phenomenology second edition (raw line 4885) signals further revision was intended. The proper architecture may be 1807 Phen. / 1812-16 original WdL / 1831-32 revised WdL + planned Phen. revision / 1827 Encyclopedia / 1830 Philosophy of Right. The 1812-16 / 1831-32 textual layering is itself a load-bearing fact tracked in the GW 21 extraction note's claim-candidate scan.
  • Should Encyclopedia (1817/1827/1830) and Philosophy of Right (1820) be ingested? They would complete the corpus and resolve the two-Hegels / three-Hegels question. The 1831 marginal note suggests Hegel himself was negotiating between these texts and the 1807 Phenomenology. The 2026-05-21 WdL ingest establishes the categorial-systematic spine that the Encyclopedia's logical part recapitulates and the Philosophy of Right extends into political philosophy.

Synthetic Claims

The synthetic interpretive layer (wiki/claims.md) articulates claims for which this page is a Wiki home.

  • live claim, see claims#1962-protokoll-as-cardinal-ereignis-source — the 1962 Todtnauberg Protokoll is the single most important published secondary source on late-Heidegger Ereignis-thinking. Bears on this page because the Protokoll supplies the two-point Hegel-Heidegger disanalogy (pp. 58–60) documented in the section above: (1) Sein-Denken-Identität-as-Gleichsetzung vs. Zusammengehören-im-Ereignis; (2) Aufhebung-der-Endlichkeit vs. Endlichkeit-im-Eigentum.
  • live claim, see claims#hegel-798-anchors-heidegger-1964-aletheia-diagnostic — §798 of the Phenomenology (raw line 4741: "the truth that has the shape of certainty") is the Phenomenology's own concentration of what Heidegger 1964 diagnoses in the Logic; the cross-source link is the wiki's interpretive extension.

Sources

  • hegel-1807-phenomenology-spirit — primary; the 2026-05-18 ingest of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807, Pinkard 2018 trans.). Anchors substance-becoming-subject (Preface §17), Sache selbst (Preface §3 / Reason §417), master-slave dialectic (§§186–196), recognition's mature form (§671 reconciling Yes), Sittlichkeit (§§438–482), Antigone (§469), the speculative Good Friday (§785), absolute knowing (§§788–808), and Hegel's 1831 marginal note (line 4885).
  • hegel-1832-wdl-sein — primary; the 2026-05-21 ingest of the 1832 revised Doctrine of Being (GW 21, ed. Hogemann/Jaeschke 1985). Anchors the Wissenschaft der Logik's opening triad (being-nothing-becoming), Daseyn and the determinacy quartet, bad vs. true infinity, Quantität, Maß and the Knotenlinie. The Vorrede zur zweyten Ausgabe (1831) is the locus classicus for the speculativer Geist der Sprache and the aufheben doctrine (raw 460, 1684–1716).
  • hegel-1813-wdl-objektive-logik — primary; the 2026-05-21 ingest of the 1812/1813 Objective Logic (GW 11, ed. Hogemann/Jaeschke 1978). The only canonical text for the Doctrine of Essence — anchors Reflexion, Schein, the four reflexionsbestimmungen (Identität / Verschiedenheit / Gegensatz / Widerspruch), Grund, Erscheinung, wirklichkeit, and the closing Substanz-Causalität-Wechselwirkung triad. The verkehrte-Welt cross-reference to Phänomenologie p. 96 (raw 5625) is Hegel's own philological bridge from 1813 Logic to 1807 Phenomenology.
  • hegel-1816-wdl-begriff — primary; the 2026-05-21 ingest of the 1816 Subjective Logic / Doctrine of the Concept (GW 12, ed. Hogemann/Jaeschke 1981). Anchors the *Begriff* as central category, the Allgemein / Besonderes / Einzelnes development, judgment-types and syllogism-figures, Objectivity (Mechanismus / Chemismus / Teleologie with list-der-vernunft), Idea (Leben / Erkennen / absolute Idee), and the closing *freie Entlassung* into Nature.
  • heidegger-1964-end-of-philosophy — Hegel as one of the two modern callers "zur Sache selbst" (GA 14 pp. 75-76); Hegel's Wahrheit des Seins in Wissenschaft der Logik (p. 86); marginal (26) on Gewißheit as "Abwandlung der überlieferten Bestimmung der Wahrheit"; marginal (27) on the question Hegel does not ask. Plus body p. 80 on speculative dialectic as a Weise of Scheinen. The 2026-05-21 WdL ingest now anchors the Wahrheit des Seins claim with direct primary-source access.
  • merleau-ponty-2022-possibility-of-philosophy — Course 3 (1960-61) "Philosophy and Nonphilosophy since Hegel" treats Hegel as historical hinge.
  • merleau-ponty-1955-adventures-of-the-dialectic — MP's earlier engagement with Hegel via Marx/Lukács.
  • merleau-ponty-1948-sense-and-non-sense — "Hegel's Existentialism" (1946); the open/closed two-Hegels distinction.