Parmenides

Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher (c. 515 BCE – after 450 BCE), of Elea in Magna Graecia. Author of a hexameter philosophical poem (the so-called Lehrgedicht) of which only fragments survive — most importantly Fragment I (the proem) and Fragment II (the two ways of inquiry). On Heidegger's late reading, Parmenides is "der erste, der dem Sein des Seienden eigens nachgedacht hat" (the first who thought-after the Sein of beings as such), and the only pre-Socratic to have named what Heidegger calls the Lichtung — though without thinking it als solche. The 1964 essay "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" cites Parmenides Fragment I, 28ff. as the locus where ἀ-λήθεια (Unverborgenheit) is named at philosophy's Anfang (beginning).

Key Points

The Aletheia citation (Fragment I, 28ff.):

χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.

Heidegger's German rendering (GA 14 p. 82-83): "du sollst aber alles erfahren: / sowohl der Unverborgenheit, der gutgerundeten, / nichtzitterndes Herz / als auch der Sterblichen Dafürhalten, dem fehlt das / Vertrauenkönnen auf Unverborgenes."
The gut-gerundete Aletheia: Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος — "well-rounded" because turned in the pure round of the circle, where everywhere Anfang und Ende dasselbe sind (beginning and end are the same). In this Drehung there is no possibility of Verdrehen, Verstellen, Verschließen (twisting, concealing, closing). The gut-gerundete Aletheia is the circle in which thinking moves unausweichlich (unavoidably).
The non-trembling heart (ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ): the ruhige Herz, Ort der Stille of Aletheia. Heidegger reads this as the quiet heart that gathers what first grants Unverborgenheit — das ist die Lichtung des Offenen (GA 14 p. 83). See lichtung §"Lichtung as Ort der Stille."
What Aletheia first grants is the Weg (way) on which thinking pursues das eine (the one) and perceives it: ὅπως ἔστιν ... εἶναι (Fragment II) — that there presences presencing. The Weg is what Aletheia gewährt allem zuvor (grants before all else).
Marginal (22): "anders als bei Parmenides." The late-Heidegger Lichtung-thinking goes beyond Parmenides. The Aletheia-Lichtung identification of the 1964 essay is post-Parmenidean — experienced im Echo des Parmenides – geschicklich — but thought beyond Parmenides's own naming. See marginal (21): "alles Folgende zu »Lichtung« Gesagte gehört in den anderen Anfang – den An-Fang – erfahren zwar im Echo des Parmenides – geschicklich – jedoch zuvor gedacht in der freilich noch kaum geklärten und darum auch nicht sagbaren »Seinsfrage« in Sein und Zeit."
Speaking unheard in the present-day sciences: GA 14 p. 82: Parmenides "noch heute, obzwar ungehört, in den Wissenschaften spricht, in die sich die Philosophie auflöst." Parmenides still speaks today in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves — but unheard. The first possibility of philosophy (per end-of-philosophy) is what Parmenides named; the last possibility is the cybernetic-scientific dispersal that no longer hears him.

Argumentative Role in Heidegger's 1964 Essay

Parmenides is the only pre-metaphysical thinker named in the 1964 essay. His role is structural: he is the limit case on the side of the first possibility, just as cybernetics is the limit case on the side of the last possibility. Three structural functions:

The Greek Anfang of Aletheia-thinking. Parmenides names Aletheia. He names her as gut-gerundet, ruhiges Herz, Ort der Stille. He does not yet think Aletheia als solche — that thinking belongs to the anderer Anfang (other beginning) of which the late Heidegger speaks. But the naming is the indispensable precedent. Without Parmenides, the 1964 essay's identification of Aletheia with Lichtung would have no Greek anchor.
The Weg-figure. Parmenides's Fragment I introduces the ὁδός (way, Weg) that thinking follows. The 1964 essay redeploys this: the task-of-thinking is on a Weg — the Weg granted by Aletheia — toward what philosophy in its Vollendung does not see. The Wegweiser (signpost) figure of the 1964 essay (philosophy itself offers the Wegweiser to the unthought) is structurally Parmenidean.
The contrast with mortals' Dafürhalten: Fragment I, 28ff. distinguishes the Aletheia-Weg from the Weg of mortals' δόξα-driven motion: "als auch der Sterblichen Dafürhalten, dem fehlt das Vertrauenkönnen auf Unverborgenes." The mortals' way lacks the trust that Unverborgenheit grants. Heidegger reads this as the diagnostic of the present age: the cybernetic regime is the Sterblicher Dafürhalten on a planetary scale. Aletheia ist nichts Sterbliches, so wenig wie der Tod selbst.

The 1962 ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι Reading — RETRACTED 1973

The 1962 *Zeit und Sein* lecture (GA 14 p. 9) reads Parmenides ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι (Fragment I) in the Vermögen / Ermöglichen sense:

"Vor Jahren (1947) wurde im »Brief über den Humanismus« zu dem genannten Spruch des Parmenides vermerkt (S. 23) [GA Bd. 9, S. 335]: »Das ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι des Parmenides ist heute noch ungedacht.« Dieser Hinweis möchte einmal anmerken, daß wir dem genannten Spruch »Es ist nämlich Sein« nicht vorschnell eine naheliegende Auslegung unterstellen dürfen, die das in ihm Gedachte unzugänglich macht. ... Indes blieb der Sinn dieses Vermögens damals und späterhin ebenso ungedacht wie das »Es«, das Sein vermag. Sein vermögen heißt: Sein ergeben und geben. In dem ἔστι verbirgt sich das Es gibt."

The 1962 reading: in the ἔστι of ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι there hides the Es gibt — the Vermögen / Ermöglichen of Sein. Parmenides is the single attestation of the Es gibt at philosophy's beginning. The 1947 Humanismusbrief established this reading; the 1962 lecture and the 1964 essay both deploy it.

The 1973 Beilage zum Vortrag Zeit und Sein retracts this reading:

"ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι – nicht erblickt. für die Deutung des ἔστι im Sinne des Ermöglichens kein Anhalt bei Parmenides. Die Stelle und Humanismusbrief [GA Bd. 9, S. 335] bedarf der Korrektur. 1973 März. vgl. Ἀληθείης ἦτορ [GA Bd. 15, S. 403 ff.]"

The retraction's scope: (a) the 1962 Zeit und Sein reading; (b) the 1947 Humanismusbrief reading; (c) by implication, the parallel 1964 essay reading on Parmenides as the first thinker of the Es gibt / Es vermag. The corrected reading is in Ἀληθείης ἦτορ (GA 15 p. 403 ff., the Holthusen Festschrift).

What the 1973 retraction does not retract: the gut-gerundete Aletheia reading of Fragment I, 28ff. (the Anfang of Aletheia-naming, the ruhige Herz / Ort der Stille identification). What is retracted is the Vermögen / Ermöglichen reading of ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι specifically. The two readings are distinct: the gut-gerundete Aletheia survives; the Es vermag falls.

Wiki-wide consequence: any wiki claim that Parmenides is the first thinker of the Es gibt (per the 1947 Humanismusbrief, 1962 lecture, 1964 essay) must be paired with the 1973 retraction. The retraction does not dismantle the Anfang-status of Parmenides for late Heidegger; it dismantles the specific Es-vermag-reading. See Phase 8 candidate: claims#heidegger-1973-parmenides-retraction (deferred from this ingest).

Cross-Corpus Pointers

Bemerkung im Lehrgedicht des Parmenides (Tabula gratulatoria März 1973 für H. E. Holthusen, Präsident der Berliner Akademie der Schönen Künste; GA 15 pp. 403ff.) — referenced in marginal (21) at GA 14 p. 84 and in the 1973 Beilage zum Vortrag Zeit und Sein. The site of the post-1973 corrected Parmenides-reading. Unconsulted on this ingest.
Parmenides lecture course (1942-43, GA 54). Not on the wiki. Heidegger's most extensive engagement with Parmenides; the 1964 essay's Aletheia-translation as Unverborgenheit and the Lichtung-as-Ort-der-Stille identification have anchors there.
Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954, GA 7) — the essays "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)" and "Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)" are the principal late-period Parmenides-Heraclitus material outside the 1942-43 lecture course. Cross-corpus pointer; unconsulted on this ingest.

Parmenides in Plato — character and method (the Parmenides dialogue)

Distinct from Heidegger's Aletheia-Parmenides, Plato gives the Eleatic two further afterlives:

The dramatic character of the Parmenides: a venerable Parmenides (~65) interrogates a teenage Socrates, raising six objections to the Theory of Forms — the Third Man, the whole-or-part dilemma of participation, the "Greatest Difficulty" — then conducts a battery of "deductions" about "the one." "If Plato has a 'spokesman' here, it is Parmenides" (Cooper).
The method-figure: Parmenides demonstrates the gymnastic method (examine the consequences of a hypothesis and its denial); in Deduction 1 his own strict Eleatic "one," pressed, is reduced to nothing ("the one neither is one nor is," 141e) — Plato turning the Eleatic monism against itself.
The "father" of the Sophist: the frg. 7 prohibition on not-being (quoted 237a, 258d) is the target of the "patricide" by which the Eleatic Visitor makes falsehood possible (see non-being).

So the wiki carries three receptions of one figure: Heidegger's pre-metaphysical Aletheia-namer; Plato's character/method-Parmenides (the Parmenides); and the Eleatic "father" whose prohibition the Sophist overturns. The frg. 7 text links the latter two; do not conflate any with the others.

Connections

is the locus classicus of aletheia — Fragment I, 28ff. attests Aletheia as gut-gerundet.
names the Lichtung without thinking it als solche — "Wo geschieht es und mit welchem Namen?... Im denkenden Gedicht des Parmenides" (GA 14 p. 82). The naming is the Greek precedent; the thinking belongs to the anderer Anfang.
speaks the Weg-figure that Heidegger's task-of-thinking redeploys.
contrasts with the mortals' Dafürhalten — the way of δόξα lacks Vertrauenkönnen auf Unverborgenes.
is "displaced beyond" by the late-Heidegger Lichtung-thinking — marginal (22) "anders als bei Parmenides"; marginal (21) on the anderer Anfang "erfahren im Echo des Parmenides."
is the first possibility of philosophy opposite to* the last possibility (cybernetic-scientific dispersal). The Weltzivilisation of 1964 no longer hears what Parmenides spoke.
is the structural opposite of plato's idea-as-light — Parmenides's gut-gerundete Aletheia is the Ort der Stille prior to the Aussehen-thinking that Plato's idea installs. Plato is the beginning of metaphysics; Parmenides is the Anfang of what metaphysics did not think. (See now plato.)
is the "father" overturned in plato-sophist — the "patricide of Parmenides": the Eleatic Visitor forces "that which is not somehow is," overturning the frg. 7 prohibition (quoted 237a, 258d) to make falsehood possible. The Sophist is the other canonical reception of Parmenides (the father-to-be-killed) beside Heidegger's Aletheia-namer — but the two turn on different fragments: Heidegger's reading anchors on Fragment I, 28ff. (the Aletheia-naming), the Sophist's patricide on the frg. 7 prohibition against "that which is not." See non-being.
is the dramatic and method figure of plato-parmenides — the character who critiques the Forms (the Third Man) and conducts the deductions, whose own strict "one" is reduced to nothing in Deduction 1.

Open Questions

What is the precise sense of "anders als bei Parmenides"? The 1964 marginal flags a displacement whose shape is articulated in Bemerkung im Lehrgedicht des Parmenides (GA 15) — unconsulted on this ingest. Does Heidegger's late reading transform Parmenides's circle (εὔκυκλος) into something else, or merely think it more deeply?
How does Parmenides's Weg relate to Heidegger's later Holzwege / Feldweg / Unterwegs trope-cluster? The Weg-figure is pervasive in late Heidegger; the Parmenidean source is structurally first.
Is there a Parmenidean thread in Heidegger's relation to Plato that differs from Heidegger's Heraclitean thread? Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954, GA 7) treats both Parmenides ("Moira") and Heraclitus ("Aletheia"). The differential treatment is unconsulted on this ingest.

Sources

heidegger-1964-end-of-philosophy — primary site for the wiki's current Parmenides content. Fragment I citation at GA 14 p. 82-83; Heidegger's German rendering and reading of gut-gerundete Aletheia and non-trembling heart; the Weg and erst gewährt analyses at p. 84; the contrast with mortals' Dafürhalten at p. 85; the anders als bei Parmenides marginal (22) at p. 84; the anderer Anfang im Echo des Parmenides marginal (21) at p. 84; cross-references to Bemerkung im Lehrgedicht des Parmenides (GA 15) and Vorträge und Aufsätze (GA 7).
heidegger-1962-zeit-und-sein — Parmenides ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι read in the Vermögen / Ermöglichen sense at GA 14 p. 9 — retracted by Heidegger himself in the 1973 Beilage zum Vortrag. The retraction's scope is the specific Es-vermag-reading; the gut-gerundete Aletheia-reading is not retracted.