Parmenides

Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher (c. 515 BCE – after 450 BCE), of Elea in Magna Graecia. Author of a hexameter philosophical poem (the so-called Lehrgedicht) of which only fragments survive — most importantly Fragment I (the proem) and Fragment II (the two ways of inquiry). On Heidegger's late reading, Parmenides is "der erste, der dem Sein des Seienden eigens nachgedacht hat" (the first who thought-after the Sein of beings as such), and the only pre-Socratic to have named what Heidegger calls the Lichtung — though without thinking it als solche. The 1964 essay "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" cites Parmenides Fragment I, 28ff. as the locus where ἀ-λήθεια (Unverborgenheit) is named at philosophy's Anfang (beginning).

Key Points

  • The Aletheia citation (Fragment I, 28ff.):

    χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.

    Heidegger's German rendering (GA 14 p. 82-83): "du sollst aber alles erfahren: / sowohl der Unverborgenheit, der gutgerundeten, / nichtzitterndes Herz / als auch der Sterblichen Dafürhalten, dem fehlt das / Vertrauenkönnen auf Unverborgenes."

  • The gut-gerundete Aletheia: Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος — "well-rounded" because turned in the pure round of the circle, where everywhere Anfang und Ende dasselbe sind (beginning and end are the same). In this Drehung there is no possibility of Verdrehen, Verstellen, Verschließen (twisting, concealing, closing). The gut-gerundete Aletheia is the circle in which thinking moves unausweichlich (unavoidably).

  • The non-trembling heart (ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ): the ruhige Herz, Ort der Stille of Aletheia. Heidegger reads this as the quiet heart that gathers what first grants Unverborgenheit — das ist die Lichtung des Offenen (GA 14 p. 83). See lichtung §"Lichtung as Ort der Stille."

  • What Aletheia first grants is the Weg (way) on which thinking pursues das eine (the one) and perceives it: ὅπως ἔστιν ... εἶναι (Fragment II) — that there presences presencing. The Weg is what Aletheia gewährt allem zuvor (grants before all else).

  • Marginal (22): "anders als bei Parmenides." The late-Heidegger Lichtung-thinking goes beyond Parmenides. The Aletheia-Lichtung identification of the 1964 essay is post-Parmenidean — experienced im Echo des Parmenides – geschicklich — but thought beyond Parmenides's own naming. See marginal (21): "alles Folgende zu »Lichtung« Gesagte gehört in den anderen Anfang – den An-Fang – erfahren zwar im Echo des Parmenides – geschicklich – jedoch zuvor gedacht in der freilich noch kaum geklärten und darum auch nicht sagbaren »Seinsfrage« in Sein und Zeit."

  • Speaking unheard in the present-day sciences: GA 14 p. 82: Parmenides "noch heute, obzwar ungehört, in den Wissenschaften spricht, in die sich die Philosophie auflöst." Parmenides still speaks today in the sciences into which philosophy dissolves — but unheard. The first possibility of philosophy (per end-of-philosophy) is what Parmenides named; the last possibility is the cybernetic-scientific dispersal that no longer hears him.

Argumentative Role in Heidegger's 1964 Essay

Parmenides is the only pre-metaphysical thinker named in the 1964 essay. His role is structural: he is the limit case on the side of the first possibility, just as cybernetics is the limit case on the side of the last possibility. Three structural functions:

  1. The Greek Anfang of Aletheia-thinking. Parmenides names Aletheia. He names her as gut-gerundet, ruhiges Herz, Ort der Stille. He does not yet think Aletheia als solche — that thinking belongs to the anderer Anfang (other beginning) of which the late Heidegger speaks. But the naming is the indispensable precedent. Without Parmenides, the 1964 essay's identification of Aletheia with Lichtung would have no Greek anchor.

  2. The Weg-figure. Parmenides's Fragment I introduces the ὁδός (way, Weg) that thinking follows. The 1964 essay redeploys this: the task-of-thinking is on a Weg — the Weg granted by Aletheia — toward what philosophy in its Vollendung does not see. The Wegweiser (signpost) figure of the 1964 essay (philosophy itself offers the Wegweiser to the unthought) is structurally Parmenidean.

  3. The contrast with mortals' Dafürhalten: Fragment I, 28ff. distinguishes the Aletheia-Weg from the Weg of mortals' δόξα-driven motion: "als auch der Sterblichen Dafürhalten, dem fehlt das Vertrauenkönnen auf Unverborgenes." The mortals' way lacks the trust that Unverborgenheit grants. Heidegger reads this as the diagnostic of the present age: the cybernetic regime is the Sterblicher Dafürhalten on a planetary scale. Aletheia ist nichts Sterbliches, so wenig wie der Tod selbst.

Cross-Corpus Pointers

  • Bemerkung im Lehrgedicht des Parmenides (Tabula gratulatoria März 1973 für H. E. Holthusen, Präsident der Berliner Akademie der Schönen Künste; GA 15 pp. 403ff.) — referenced in marginal (21) at GA 14 p. 84. Unconsulted on this ingest. Presumably articulates the post-Parmenidean displacement marginal (22) flags.
  • Parmenides lecture course (1942-43, GA 54). Not on the wiki. Heidegger's most extensive engagement with Parmenides; the 1964 essay's Aletheia-translation as Unverborgenheit and the Lichtung-as-Ort-der-Stille identification have anchors there.
  • Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954, GA 7) — the essays "Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)" and "Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)" are the principal late-period Parmenides-Heraclitus material outside the 1942-43 lecture course. Cross-corpus pointer; unconsulted on this ingest.

Connections

  • is the locus classicus of aletheia — Fragment I, 28ff. attests Aletheia as gut-gerundet.
  • names the Lichtung without thinking it als solche — "Wo geschieht es und mit welchem Namen?... Im denkenden Gedicht des Parmenides" (GA 14 p. 82). The naming is the Greek precedent; the thinking belongs to the anderer Anfang.
  • speaks the Weg-figure that Heidegger's task-of-thinking redeploys.
  • contrasts with the mortals' Dafürhalten — the way of δόξα lacks Vertrauenkönnen auf Unverborgenes.
  • is "displaced beyond" by the late-Heidegger Lichtung-thinking — marginal (22) "anders als bei Parmenides"; marginal (21) on the anderer Anfang "erfahren im Echo des Parmenides."
  • is the first possibility of philosophy opposite to* the last possibility (cybernetic-scientific dispersal). The Weltzivilisation of 1964 no longer hears what Parmenides spoke.
  • is the structural opposite of plato's idea-as-light — Parmenides's gut-gerundete Aletheia is the Ort der Stille prior to the Aussehen-thinking that Plato's idea installs. Plato is the beginning of metaphysics; Parmenides is the Anfang of what metaphysics did not think. (Plato has no entity page yet.)

Open Questions

  • What is the precise sense of "anders als bei Parmenides"? The 1964 marginal flags a displacement whose shape is articulated in Bemerkung im Lehrgedicht des Parmenides (GA 15) — unconsulted on this ingest. Does Heidegger's late reading transform Parmenides's circle (εὔκυκλος) into something else, or merely think it more deeply?
  • How does Parmenides's Weg relate to Heidegger's later Holzwege / Feldweg / Unterwegs trope-cluster? The Weg-figure is pervasive in late Heidegger; the Parmenidean source is structurally first.
  • Is there a Parmenidean thread in Heidegger's relation to Plato that differs from Heidegger's Heraclitean thread? Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954, GA 7) treats both Parmenides ("Moira") and Heraclitus ("Aletheia"). The differential treatment is unconsulted on this ingest.

Sources

  • heidegger-1964-end-of-philosophy — primary site for the wiki's current Parmenides content. Fragment I citation at GA 14 p. 82-83; Heidegger's German rendering and reading of gut-gerundete Aletheia and non-trembling heart; the Weg and erst gewährt analyses at p. 84; the contrast with mortals' Dafürhalten at p. 85; the anders als bei Parmenides marginal (22) at p. 84; the anderer Anfang im Echo des Parmenides marginal (21) at p. 84; cross-references to Bemerkung im Lehrgedicht des Parmenides (GA 15) and Vorträge und Aufsätze (GA 7).