Zeitlichkeit (Temporality)

Heidegger's name for the ekstatic-horizonal originary time that is the ontological sense of Sorge — the structural totality of Dasein. "Zeitlichkeit enthüllt sich als der Sinn der eigentlichen Sorge" (Sein und Zeit § 65, H. 326). Zeitlichkeit is not a constant flow into which Dasein is inserted but the Zeitigung (temporalizing) by which Dasein temporalizes itself in three irreducible Ekstasen: Zukunft (future), Gewesenheit (having-been), Gegenwart (present). It is finite — its primary ekstasis is the future, futural precisely because grasped vom Tode her (from death). The vulgar concept of time as an infinite sequence of nows is its abkünftige (derivative) leveled-down form.

Key Points

  • The three Ekstasen. Zukunft / Gewesenheit / Gegenwart — not "future / past / present" in the ordinary sense but ekstatic modes of Auf-sich-zu (toward-itself), Zurück-auf (back-onto), and Begegnenlassen-von (letting-encounter). "Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche »Außer-sich« an und für sich selbst" (SuZ § 65, H. 329). Temporality is not a flow but a being-outside-itself in the three directions at once.
  • Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich. Originary temporality is not a being but a temporalizing: "Die Zeitlichkeit 'ist' überhaupt kein Seiendes. Sie ist nicht, sondern zeitigt sich" (SuZ § 65, H. 328). The three ekstases are not accumulated stages of a process; they are the equiprimordial modes of one temporalizing-event.
  • Sorge ↔ Zeitlichkeit, term by term. Sich-vorweg-sein (the existentiality of Sorge) ↔ Zukunft. Schon-sein-in... (facticity) ↔ Gewesenheit. Sein-bei... (falling, in the everyday mode) ↔ Gegenwart (as Gegenwärtigen, making-present). The triple correspondence is the test of the Existenzialanalytik's coherence — if Sorge is unitary and Zeitlichkeit is its meaning, then each Sorge-moment must be temporalizable.
  • Zukunft has primacy. "Das primäre Phänomen der ursprünglichen und eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit ist die Zukunft" (SuZ § 65, H. 329). Not because Dasein "looks forward" but because its being is Sich-vorweg-sein — Dasein is its possibilities by projecting onto them. The primacy is structural, not psychological.
  • Originary Zeitlichkeit is finite. It is not "later truncated" by death; it is originarily finite because grasped vom Tode her — the eigenste, unüberholbare Möglichkeit of sein-zum-tode is what gives temporality its definiteness as ekstasis (rather than as endless flow). The vulgar "endless time" is the derivative, not the originary — "Nur weil die ursprüngliche Zeit endlich ist, kann sich die 'abgeleitete' als un-endliche zeitigen" (SuZ § 65, H. 331).
  • Vulgar time as derivative. Aristotle's ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (Phys. A 10–14) — the now-sequence — is not wrong, but it is derivative: it stems from a nivellierung (leveling-down) of originary Zeitlichkeit, in which the ekstatic structure is flattened into a sequence of identical now-points. Innerzeitigkeit — being-"in"-time as Vorhandenes is "in" a container — is the Seinsart of non-Dasein entities, derived from Dasein's Besorgen of time (the publicness of time via clock-reckoning, calendars, schedules; see SuZ §§ 78–81).
  • Distinguish Zeitlichkeit (Dasein) from Temporalität (Being). Heidegger reserves Zeitlichkeit for Dasein's ekstatic time, Temporalität for the temporal characterization of being itself. The book's closing aporia (§ 83) leaves open whether Zeitlichkeit-of-Dasein opens out into Temporalität-of-Sein. "Führt ein Weg von der ursprünglichen Zeit zum Sinn des Seins? Offenbart sich die Zeit selbst als Horizont des Seins?" The unwritten third Abschnitt ("Zeit und Sein") was to step into this gap; the 1962 lecture of the same title partly returns to it.

Details

Why Zeitlichkeit is "the sense" of Sorge, not "a feature"

The phrase Sinn der Sorge (sense / meaning of Sorge) is technical. Sinn in SuZ (§ 32) is "das Woraufhin des primären Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als das, was es ist, in seiner Möglichkeit begriffen werden kann" — the toward-which of the primary projection from which something can be understood in its possibility as what it is. To say Zeitlichkeit ist der Sinn der Sorge is therefore: Zeitlichkeit is the Woraufhin from which Sorge as the structural totality of Dasein becomes intelligible as such. Not "temporality is a feature of care" — but "temporality is the meaning-horizon within which the structural unity of care becomes possible."

The ekstatic-horizonal scheme

Each Ekstasis has a Horizont — the horizonal scheme of the toward-which of each ekstasis. SuZ (§ 69) names them: the horizon of the future is the Umwillen seiner (for-the-sake-of-oneself); the horizon of having-been is the Wovor of thrownness; the horizon of the present is the Um-zu (in-order-to) of practical engagement. The Zeitlichkeit-structure thus produces both the time of Dasein and the world it inhabits — Welt (in SuZ's existential sense) is a horizon-structure of Zeitlichkeit.

Eigentliche vs. uneigentliche Zeitlichkeit

Zeitlichkeit temporalizes itself in two grundsätzlich different ways (SuZ § 65 ff.):

  • Eigentliche (authentic) Zeitlichkeit — the vorlaufende Entschlossenheit into one's ownmost being-toward-death. The primary ekstasis is the eigentliche Zukunft (running ahead into the unüberholbare Möglichkeit); from it the eigentliche Gewesenheit arises (resolute taking-over of thrownness) and the eigentliche Gegenwart (the Augenblick — the resolute moment that brings the situation into view). The temporal mode of eigentlich existence.
  • Uneigentliche (inauthentic) Zeitlichkeit — the gegenwärtigend-besorgende (concernful making-present) temporality of Verfallen and das Man. The primary ekstasis is the Gegenwart of absorbed engagement; the uneigentliche Zukunft is the Erwarten (mere awaiting) of an "event"; the uneigentliche Gewesenheit is Vergessen (forgetting). The temporal mode of average everydayness.

The distinction is not normative: both are equiprimordial modes of Zeitlichkeit, and most Dasein is most of the time in the uneigentliche mode. Eigentliche Zeitlichkeit is the existentiell-possible mode that vorlaufende Entschlossenheit makes existenzial-visible.

Geschichtlichkeit follows from Zeitlichkeit

The Geschichtlichkeit (historicity) of Dasein is not added to Zeitlichkeit; it is a concrete elaboration of Zeitlichkeit (SuZ § 74). Schicksal (fate) and Geschick (destiny) are existential modes of how Dasein temporally relates to its Erbe (heritage). Wiederholung (repetition) is the mode of authentic historical existence — taking over a possibility from one's heritage as one's own in the eigentliche Gegenwart of the Augenblick. "Das eigentliche Sein zum Tode, das heißt die Endlichkeit der Zeitlichkeit, ist der verborgene Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins" (SuZ § 74, H. 386).

The Hegel-engagement at § 82

§ 82 is the only published "station" of the projected Destruktion of the history of ontology (Part II of the book). Heidegger reads Hegel as the most extreme Nivellierung of the Aristotelian now-sequence: Hegel's identification of time as the angeschaute Negativität (Encyclopedia § 257) — "das angeschaute Werden" — is, under analysis, the formal-dialectical articulation of Punktualität and Jetzt-folge. "Hegels Charakteristik der Zeit aus dem Jetzt setzt voraus, daß dieses in seiner volle Struktur verdeckt und nivelliert bleibt" (SuZ § 82a, H. 432). Heidegger's counter-thesis: "Der 'Geist' fällt nicht erst in die Zeit, sondern existiert als ursprüngliche Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit" (§ 82, H. 435). Spirit does not fall into time; spirit is the originary temporalizing of temporality. (The note at H. 432 also signals that Bergson's durée operates in the same Aristotelian inheritance: Bergson reacts against it but does not escape it.)

The closing aporia of S&Z

The book ends on two questions, not a thesis: "Führt ein Weg von der ursprünglichen Zeit zum Sinn des Seins? Offenbart sich die Zeit selbst als Horizont des Seins?" (§ 83, H. 437). The transition from Zeitlichkeit-of-Dasein to Temporalität-of-Being is signposted but not traversed. The unwritten third Abschnitt ("Zeit und Sein") was to step into this gap. Heidegger's 1962 lecture Zeit und Sein (in the collection Zur Sache des Denkens — in raw/ but not yet ingested as a separate source) partly returns to it. The Kehre in Heidegger's later thought is in part the attempt to approach this gap from the side of Sein/Ereignis toward Dasein, rather than from Dasein toward Being.

Connections

  • is the ontological sense of sorge — Zeitlichkeit is the Woraufhin of Sorge.
  • is the temporal structure of dasein — Dasein is its temporalizing.
  • grounds sein-zum-tode — death is grasped as Möglichkeit because Dasein is Sich-vorweg (Zukunft).
  • grounds Geschichtlichkeit — historicity is the concretion of Zeitlichkeit (SuZ § 74).
  • is the locus classicus developed in heidegger-1927-sein-und-zeit §§ 65–66, 67–71, 78–82.
  • contrasts with (and is silent partner to) MP's corporeal-perceptual temporality of Phenomenology of Perception and the chiasmic temporality of the V&I working notes — see claims#time-as-late-mp-privileged-ontological-clue (supported) and passence-as-mp-presence-of-absence (live). MP's temporality is not Heidegger's Zeitlichkeit: MP takes the body's pre-objective opening as the time-locus, where Heidegger takes the projective being-toward-death. The two share the rejection of vulgar now-time but ground its rejection differently.
  • contrasts with Aristotle's ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως — see SuZ § 82 footnote at H. 432.
  • contrasts with Hegel's angeschaute Negativität — see SuZ § 82 (the published Destruktion-station).
  • contrasts with Bergson's durée — Bergson reacts against the Aristotelian inheritance but operates within it (SuZ § 82 footnote at H. 432). The wiki should mark Bergson-Heidegger as a false-friend rather than a structural-parallel: see Open Questions below.
  • is distinguished from lichtung though intimately connected — the Lichtung is the spatial-disclosive figure (already at § 28); Zeitlichkeit is its temporal articulation. The 1964 essay's renamed task — Lichtung und Anwesenheit — re-grounds this connection (see lichtung).
  • opens out toward but does not reach ontological-difference via Temporalität-of-Sein — the closing aporia (§ 83) leaves the relation between Zeitlichkeit (Dasein) and Temporalität (Being) open. The post-Kehre writings on Ereignis are the attempt to traverse this gap.

Open Questions

  • Bergson — false friend or hidden ally? Heidegger says Bergson takes the vulgar concept of time and identifies it with space — wrongly, since both are derivative of originary Zeitlichkeit. But Bergson's durée and Heidegger's Zeitlichkeit share the rejection of homogeneous-now-sequence time. Is the alliance structural and the disagreement diagnostic, or vice versa? The wiki should flag this as a false-friend candidate until adjudicated.
  • Does the post-Kehre Heidegger retire "Zeitlichkeit" in favor of "Ereignis"? The 1962 lecture Zeit und Sein speaks of es gibt Zeit and the gift of presencing without consistently using the SuZ vocabulary. Whether the Zeitlichkeit-analysis remains operative or is superseded is a live interpretive question.
  • MP's relation to Zeitlichkeit. MP's PhP Part Three Ch. II on temporality engages Husserl extensively but Heidegger sparingly. Given the supported claim that MP's S&Z reception is archivally thin (see claims#mp-heidegger-reception-archivally-thin), it is not the case that MP's temporality is a corporeal translation of Zeitlichkeit. The relation deserves explicit philological re-examination.

Sources

  • heidegger-1927-sein-und-zeit — locus classicus. Key sections: § 5 (the program: time as the horizon of the understanding of being), § 65 (Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn der Sorge — definitional), § 66 (tasks of the temporal Wiederholung of the existential analytic), §§ 67–71 (temporal interpretation of everyday Dasein-structures), §§ 72–77 (Geschichtlichkeit), §§ 78–81 (Innerzeitigkeit and the genesis of the vulgar concept), § 82 (Hegel-engagement), § 83 (closing aporia).
  • heidegger-1964-end-of-philosophy — the 1964 essay's renamed task as Lichtung und Anwesenheit and the marginal reframing of the SuZ-Seinsfrage as the question of the Herkunft of the ontological difference (GA 14 p. 87) bear on how Zeitlichkeit-of-Dasein opens (or does not open) onto Temporalität-of-Sein. The "Zeit und Sein" 1962 lecture in the same volume is the post-Kehre return to the closing aporia of § 83 (not yet ingested as a separate source).