Nietzsche II

Author(s): Martin Heidegger Year: 1961 (compositions: 1939, 1940, 1941, 1944-46; published Neske 1961, GA 6.2 ed. Brigitte Schillbach 1997) Type: Hybrid (lecture course + Abhandlungen + genealogical sketches + methodological meditation)

The second of two volumes assembling Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche. Where *Nietzsche I* (1936-39) moved through close readings of will to power, art, eternal recurrence, and knowledge, Nietzsche II (1939-46) traces the consequences of the Vollendung-thesis for the understanding of nihilism, the history of Being, and the possibility of thinking after metaphysics. The volume spans seven sections of heterogeneous form: two concluding lectures from the broken-off 1939 course (IV), a full 1940 lecture course on European nihilism (V), a systematic 1940 treatise on Nietzsche's five Grundworte (VI), the deepest late treatise on nihilism reinterpreted from the history of Being (VII, 1944-46), a genealogy of metaphysics-as-history-of-Being (VIII, 1941), compressed working sketches (IX, 1941), and a closing meditation on Erinnerung (X, 1941). The central argumentative arc moves from Nietzsche's own understanding of nihilism (value-devaluation) to Heidegger's seinsgeschichtlich (being-historical) determination: nihilism is not a human attitude toward values but das Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen — Being's own staying-away.

Core Arguments

  1. Claim: The eternal recurrence and will to power say dasselbe (the same): will to power neuzeitlich, eternal recurrence endgeschichtlich. Will to power is the Was-sein (essentia); eternal recurrence is the Daß-sein (existentia). Their unspoken unity founds the "Zeitalter der vollendeten Sinnlosigkeit." Because: Both rest on the Leitentwurf of Being as Beständigkeit des Anwesens (constancy of presence). Eternal recurrence is the "beständigste Beständigung des Werdens" — the most constant stabilization of becoming. That their unity remains ungesprochen seals off Being from questioning. Against: Readings that separate them into two doctrines; readings that take Nietzsche as post-metaphysical.

  2. Claim: Nietzsche's five Grundworte (Will to Power, Nihilism, Eternal Recurrence, Übermensch, Gerechtigkeit) correspond to the five structural moments of metaphysics as such: essentia, history-of-truth, existentia, humanity, essence-of-truth. "Jedes dieser Grundworte nennt zugleich das, was die übrigen sagen." Because: Metaphysics necessarily articulates these five moments. Nietzsche's five titles are not parallel doctrines but five faces of one unified Grundstellung — the metaphysics of the unconditional and completed subjectivity of the will to power. Against: Treating them as independent doctrines or privileging one as the "main title."

  3. Claim: Descartes's cogito is essentially cogito me cogitare — every representation co-represents the representing I. This establishes: Sein = Vorgestelltheit (representedness), Wahrheit = Gewißheit (certainty). Nietzsche's replacement of consciousness with body (Leib) changes nothing about this Grundstellung. Because: "Daß Nietzsche an die Stelle der Seele und des Bewußtseins den Leib setzt, ändert nichts an der metaphysischen Grundstellung, die durch Descartes festgelegt ist. Sie wird durch Nietzsche nur vergrößert und an die Grenze oder gar in den Bezirk der unbedingten Sinnlosigkeit gebracht." Against: Reading Nietzsche's anti-Descartes polemics as exiting modern subjectivism.

  4. Claim: The trajectory ἰδέα → perceptio → Bedingung der Möglichkeit → Wert is a single genealogical line. Nietzsche's value-thinking is the completion of Plato's ἀγαθόν. "Die Vorzeichnung für den Wertgedanken ist im Beginn der Metaphysik vollzogen. Das Wertdenken wird zum Vollzug der Vollendung der Metaphysik." Because: Plato's ἀγαθόν is not "the Good" morally but the tauglich-Machende (enabling). Being acquires the character of Ermöglichen and Bedingung. The enabling-condition structure runs from ἀγαθόν through Descartes-Kant to Nietzsche's Wert. Against: Reading value-thinking as a modern aberration.

  5. Claim: "Die Metaphysik ist als Metaphysik der eigentliche Nihilismus." The proper essence of nihilism is das Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen — Being's staying-away. This is not a failure of thought but a positive character of Being itself: "Das Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen ist das Sein selbst... Dieser zu sich selbst entschwindende Schleier... ist das Nichts als das Sein selbst." Because: Metaphysics thinks beings with regard to Being but never thinks Being als solches (as such) — "gemäß dem eigensten Fragesinn der Metaphysik." Nietzsche's nihilism concerns beings (value-devaluation); the eigentlich nihilism concerns Being itself. This has been underway since the beginning of metaphysics. Against: Any reading that distinguishes "good" from "bad" metaphysics; Nietzsche's self-understanding as having overcome nihilism.

  6. Claim: Nihilism cannot be "overcome" (überwunden). The only genuine response is Entgegendenken (thinking-toward Being's withdrawal) and the Schritt zurück (step back) out of metaphysical thinking. Nihilism in its proper sense is ultimately "das Versprechen des Seins in seiner Unverborgenheit" — Being's promise of unconcealment. "Das Wesen der Metaphysik beruht darin, daß sie die Geschichte des Geheimnisses des Versprechens des Seins selbst ist." Because: To "overcome" nihilism would mean going against Being's own staying-away, which is self-defeating. The Überwindung-programs are themselves the Vollendung of nihilism. Against: All programs for overcoming nihilism through new value-positing.

  7. Claim: The history of metaphysics is a history of concealed transformations in the meaning of Being: ἐνέργεια (Werkheit) → actualitas (Wirklichkeit) → certitudo → Vorgestelltheit → Wille → Wille zum Willen. The key distinction is Subiectität (Being determined from subiectum generally, spanning ἰδέα to Wille zur Macht) vs. Subjektivität (ego-determined, self-securing subjectivity — one modern form of Subiectität). Because: Each terminological "translation" (ἐνέργεια → actualitas, ὑποκείμενον → subiectum) conceals a fundamental transformation while masquerading as preservation. "Alle abendländische Geschichte seitdem in einem mehrfachen Sinne römisch und niemals mehr griechisch." Against: Treating these transformations as neutral translations.

Argumentative Movement

The volume moves through four distinct registers:

  • Sections IV-V: From the ungesprochen unity of eternal recurrence and will to power → through the three forms of nihilism → Protagoras-Descartes comparison (Mäßigung vs. Anmaßung) → the cogito as cogito me cogitare → Nietzsche's deeper-than-opposition dependence on Descartes → the ontological difference as the unquestioned ground → Being as a priori → the ἰδέα-ἀγαθόν-Wert genealogy → the seven antinomies of Sein. The arc: from nihilism-as-cultural-event to nihilism-as-metaphysical-structure.

  • Section VI: Systematic reconstruction of the five Grundworte as five moments of one Grundstellung. Each Grundwort when fully thought requires the others. Gerechtigkeit (justice) as the essence of truth reveals the unheard echo of ἀλήθεια. The whole: "die Metaphysik der unbedingten und vollendeten Subjektivität des Willens zur Macht."

  • Section VII: The deepest movement: from Nietzsche's determination of nihilism (concerning beings/values) to the seinsgeschichtlich determination (concerning Being itself). Being's staying-away (Ausbleiben) is its own positive character → the threefold Ausbleiben/Entzug/Seinsverlassenheit → Überwindung ruled out → Entgegendenken and Schritt zurück → nihilism as Being's Versprechen (promise) → metaphysics as "die Geschichte des Geheimnisses des Versprechens des Seins."

  • Sections VIII-X: Genealogical-historical. Section VIII traces transformations of Being from Greek to Leibniz. Section IX compresses the entire genealogy into schemas and fragments (the vertical diagram ἀλήθεια → Machenschaft/Ge-stell; the 11-point genealogy of Existenz). Section X closes with Erinnerung (seinsgeschichtlich recollection): "Nichts geschieht, das Ereignis ereignet."

Key Findings

  • The five Grundworte form one unified Grundstellung; the unsettled "main title" (WP? ER? Umwertung?) is not incompleteness but the inner movement of truth
  • Nietzsche stands more deeply under Descartes's law than any other modern thinker — through opposition, not agreement
  • Being shows the double face of Leerste and Reichtum; the seven antinomies resist dialectical resolution
  • Metaphysics as such is the proper nihilism — not by failure but by structural necessity
  • Being's staying-away is Being itself; the Nothing of nihilism's nihil is Being as self-withdrawing
  • The genealogy ἰδέα → actualitas → Wert is a single continuous transformation with concealment at every step
  • Subiectität (spanning ἰδέα to Wille zur Macht) is broader than Subjektivität (ego-determined)

Methodology

Hybrid: Auseinandersetzung (confrontation) with Nietzsche as in NI, plus seinsgeschichtlich thinking (VII-X) that steps beyond the Auseinandersetzung-frame. Sections IV-VI still operate within the metaphysical confrontation; VII-X think from the history of Being, not about Nietzsche. The transition from V/VI to VII is the crucial shift from metaphysical to being-historical register.

Concepts Developed

Concepts Referenced

Terminology

German English Translation Notes
Ausbleiben staying-away positive ontological determination, not absence/failure
Subiectität subiectity neologism; broader than Subjektivität; spans ἰδέα to WzM
Machenschaft machination mode of Being in completed epoch; linked to Ge-stell
Entgegendenken thinking-toward alternative to Überwindung; toward Being's withdrawal
Versprechen promise Being's promise of unconcealment, concealing itself as promise
Werkheit workhood ἐνέργεια properly; vs. Wirklichkeit (actuality/effectiveness)
Mäßigung measured restraint Protagoras's mode of measure-giving
Anmaßung arrogation Descartes's mode of measure-giving
Sinnlosigkeit meaninglessness experiential register of Vollendung; consequence, not cause

Key Passages

"Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen — das ist der höchste Wille zur Macht." (VI, WzM n. 617)

"Die Vorzeichnung für den Wertgedanken ist im Beginn der Metaphysik vollzogen. Das Wertdenken wird zum Vollzug der Vollendung der Metaphysik." (V)

"Daß Nietzsche an die Stelle der Seele und des Bewußtseins den Leib setzt, ändert nichts an der metaphysischen Grundstellung, die durch Descartes festgelegt ist." (V)

"Das Wesen des Nihilismus ist die Geschichte, in der es mit dem Sein selbst nichts ist." (VII)

"Die Metaphysik ist als Metaphysik der eigentliche Nihilismus." (VII)

"Das Ausbleiben des Seins als solchen ist das Sein selbst... Im Ausbleiben verhüllt sich dieses mit sich selbst. Dieser zu sich selbst entschwindende Schleier, als welcher das Sein selbst im Ausbleiben west, ist das Nichts als das Sein selbst." (VII)

"Der Nihilismus ist, in seinem Wesen und auf das Eigentliche gedacht, das Versprechen des Seins in seiner Unverborgenheit." (VII)

"Das Wesen der Metaphysik beruht darin, daß sie die Geschichte des Geheimnisses des Versprechens des Seins selbst ist." (VII)

"Sein ist Anwesenheit als Sichzeigen des Aussehens. Sein ist Verweilen des Jeweiligen in solchem Aussehen." (VIII)

"Alle abendländische Geschichte seitdem in einem mehrfachen Sinne römisch und niemals mehr griechisch." (VIII)

"Nichts geschieht, das Ereignis ereignet. Der Anfang nimmt — austragend die Lichtung — den Abschied an sich." (X)

"Jedes dieser Grundworte nennt zugleich das, was die übrigen sagen." (VI)

"Das Sein ist das Leerste und zugleich der Reichtum, aus dem alles Seiende... begabt wird mit der jeweiligen Wesensart seines Seins." (V)

What's Not Obvious

  1. Section VII is the philosophical center of gravity, not Sections IV-VI. The 1944-46 treatise on nihilism is the latest and deepest section. Here Heidegger moves beyond Nietzsche's own categories entirely — nihilism becomes a determination of Being's own self-concealing history, not a human attitude. The Versprechen-thesis (nihilism as Being's promise) is the most positive moment in either volume and receives no development elsewhere in Heidegger's published corpus with this specific formulation. This passage (raw line 2612) is load-bearing for understanding what Heidegger thinks lies beyond the diagnosis of Seinsverlassenheit.

  2. The Protagoras-Descartes comparison (Section V) is the genealogical keystone for the Leib-does-not-change-the-Grundstellung thesis. Heidegger does not simply assert that Nietzsche's Leib is another form of subiectum. He first establishes the two fundamentally different modes of the human as measure (Mäßigung vs. Anmaßung), then shows that Nietzsche's Leib operates within the Anmaßung-mode, not the Mäßigung-mode. The comparison is what makes the thesis non-trivial: if Protagoras and Descartes were already the same Grundstellung, there would be nothing to argue. The fact that they differ categorically — and that Nietzsche is on the Descartes side — is what makes the Leib-thesis philosophically consequential.

  3. The seven antinomies of Sein (Section V, raw line 1813) are not an argument-step but a phenomenological demonstration. Heidegger does not resolve them; he uses them to show that our Bezug zum Sein (relation to Being) is constitutively zwiespältig (bifurcated). The antinomies are the experiential evidence for the ontological difference: we always stand on the emptiness-side while Being is also the richest. This passage connects unexpectedly to Merleau-Ponty's thinking of the invisible as the reverse of the visible — not its negation but its non-coincident depth. The structural parallel (non-coincidence of what is most familiar and what is most hidden) warrants investigation but is a false-friend candidate — Heidegger's antinomies are determinations of Sein, not of perception.

Critique / Limitations

  • The transition from diagnosis (Seinsverlassenheit, metaphysics = nihilism) to positive articulation of Entgegendenken remains promissory. Heidegger names the alternative but does not perform it in this text.
  • The assumed Leitentwurf (Being as constancy of presence governing all Western metaphysics since the Greeks) is presupposed from Sein und Zeit and Beiträge, not argued within this text.
  • The 1940 lecture course (Section V) and the 1944-46 treatise (Section VII) belong to different phases of Heidegger's thought; Section VII explicitly goes beyond the categories Section V operates with. The seam between them is a philosophical tension, not just a compositional one.
  • Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is intensely selective — focused on the Will to Power notebooks and late 1887-88 fragments, with minimal engagement of published works (Zarathustra is drawn from NI, not NII; Genealogy of Morals appears only in citations). The reader who knows Nietzsche primarily through the published books will find an unfamiliar Nietzsche here.

Connections

  • is the completion of heidegger-1961-nietzsche-i — NII picks up where NI's broken-off Course III ends (IV) and deepens every major thesis
  • extends vollendung-der-metaphysik — from "completion of the Leitfrage" to "the epoch that installs Seinsverlassenheit and Machenschaft"
  • deepens ontological-difference — Section V's most sustained treatment in the Nietzsche volumes
  • reinterprets seinsgeschichte — VII explicitly thematizes the seinsgeschichtlich as a determination distinct from the metaphysical
  • extends wahrheit-als-gerechtigkeit — VI gives the fullest development; Gerechtigkeit as echo of ἀλήθεια
  • extends eternal-recurrence — VI adds deductive argument and essentia/existentia pairing
  • is structurally parallel to (with false-friend caution) merleau-ponty-1968-visible-and-invisible — the seven antinomies of Sein echo visible/invisible non-coincidence; but Heidegger's are determinations of Sein, not of perception
  • critiques friedrich-nietzsche — Nietzsche as the letzter Metaphysiker whose anti-metaphysical claims are the completion of metaphysics

Open Questions

  • How does the Versprechen-thesis (VII) relate to the Ereignis-thinking of Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-38)? The wiki does not yet hold Beiträge.
  • Does Merleau-Ponty's 1959-60 reading of Heidegger (in PoP Course 1) engage the VII-level seinsgeschichtlich nihilism determination, or only the V/VI-level metaphysical nihilism?
  • The Subiectität-concept (broader than Subjektivität) has no presence in the secondary literature the wiki currently holds. Is it taken up by any of the Heidegger-commentators?
  • Does Chouraqui's reading of Nietzsche (chouraqui-2014-ambiguity-and-absolute) engage Heidegger's Nietzsche II specifically, or only the NI-level reading?

Sources