Voyance
Merleau-Ponty's technical term for the double sight by which vision sees farther than it sees — not a second faculty but the structure of all vision once philosophy takes seriously that "the invisible is the outline and the depth of the visible" (*Signs* Intro, 20–21). Voyance is a carnal Wesenschau: a vision of essences that is not kosmotheoréin (absolute contemplating from outside) but essence-seeing inseparable from sensible vision. It renders present to us what is absent, not by presentifying it but by creating a particular presence "that had never been present before" (Carbone 2015, Intro). The term appears once in MP's published writings (misleadingly rendered as "visualization" in the English *Eye and Mind*) but recurs throughout his 1958–61 preparatory course notes, where it organizes the late ontology's account of vision.
Key Points
- Not "clairvoyance": the French voyance is MP's adopted technical term, distinct from the Platonic "second sight" directed at the intelligible. As the Nijhuis translation of *Flesh of Images* flags (Intro n11): "in view of the misunderstandings that might occur if the Platonic meaning of such a notion were accepted, the original French term will be employed."
- Carnal Wesenschau: voyance is "a vision that sees the invisible in the visible" — not a mental intuition of essences disincarnate from sensible vision, but essence-seeing operating through the sensible. MP's critique of Husserl's "myth" of disembodied Wesenerschauung (V&I 116) is the negative counterpart of this positive formulation.
- Seeing according to, or with: voyance is the epistemic register of the E&M formula "I do not look at a painting as one looks at a thing, fixing it in its place. Rather than seeing it, I see according to, or with it" (E&M 126). The painting is not an object but a vector of vision.
- Not Vor-stellung: voyance refuses the Heideggerian Vor-stellung (representation, "setting up before the mind") and its Cartesian assujettissement (subjection of the object). Instead, vision is seconder — "seconding" the self-showing of the sensible universe.
- The 1960–61 course notes are the locus: voyance is organized and developed in MP's preparatory notes for "Cartesian Ontology and the Ontology of Today" (see merleau-ponty-2022-possibility-of-philosophy); the term occurs several times and anchors MP's account of the mutation in the relationship between humanity and Being.
Details
Rimbaud's Lettre du voyant: The Literary Source
Rimbaud's 1871 letter to Paul Demeny ("the Lettre du voyant") proclaims the poet as voyant: one who must become so "by a long, gigantic, and rational derangement of all the senses." MP borrows the term for a phenomenological-ontological reuse — not the poet's derangement, but the structure of a vision that does not think but instead welcomes the self-showing. "This does not mean not to think anymore — the derangement of the senses is the breaking down of the divisions between them in order to rediscover their indivision — And that way, a thought that is not mine, but theirs" (MP, NC 186).
Deleuze later summarizes Rimbaud's formula as a possible compression of Kant's Critique of Judgment — "the formula of a profoundly romantic Kant" (Essays Critical and Clinical, 33). The convergence: aesthetic ideas (Kant's KpU §49), voyance, sensible ideas, all describe a mode of thinking-through-sensing that refuses the concept.
Max Ernst and the "Making Seen Within"
The pivotal extension of Rimbaud to painting comes via Max Ernst's declaration: "Just as the role of the poet since the famous Lettre du voyant consists in writing under the dictation of what is being thought, of what articulates itself in him, the painter's role is to circumscribe and project what is making itself seen within himself" (Charbonnier, Le Monologue du peintre I, 34, quoted V&I 208 and E&M 128–129).
What Ernst provides is the formula: painting as the circumscription of what is making itself seen within. This is voyance as a structure of vision itself: the painter is not a neutral observer or imagining subject but the site where the visible makes itself seen through the painter's body.
Da Vinci's Defense, Merleau-Ponty's Extension to Speech
In 1960–61, MP notes that "da Vinci vindicates the voyance against poetry" (merleau-ponty-2022-possibility-of-philosophy 175) — because poetry, unlike painting, cannot achieve simultaneity (Leonardo's charge against the literary arts). MP's move is counter-Leonardo: "moderns make of poetry also a voyance" (175). Rimbaud, Claudel, Valéry, Saint-John Perse, Claude Simon — all perform an arts-of-speech voyance that rediscovers in speech "the transcendence of the same type that occurs in vision" (183).
This is why voyance is not regional to painting: it is the general structure of vision, and language (on the modern reading MP credits) is another register of the same structure. Philosophy itself, MP writes in a V&I working note, "makes us see by words. Like all literature" (V&I 266) — and this is voyance applied to philosophical speech.
Voyance as "Magical Idea of Visibility"
MP characterizes the literature-of-his-epoch as renewing the "magical idea of visibility" (merleau-ponty-2022-possibility-of-philosophy 183): "the thing that makes itself seen (outside and inside), over there and here." The Signs Introduction glosses this: "the visible things and the visible world […] are always behind what I see of them, as horizons, and what we call visibility is this very transcendence. No thing, no side of a thing, shows itself except by actively hiding the others, denouncing them in the act of concealing them" (Signs Intro, 20–21).
Voyance is the gnoseological register of this self-concealing-showing structure: seeing-farther = seeing the invisible as the depth of the visible through the active hiding that constitutes the showing.
Three Registers Converging: Aesthetics, Ontology, Gnoseology
Christine Buci-Glucksmann (The Madness of Vision, 24–25) organizes the convergence: "Voyance — by which things absent become present to us — defines simultaneously the place of art and the access to Being, the simultaneous appearance of an aesthetics and an 'ontology.'" Carbone adds the third term: a gnoseology — "voyance is also defining a totally virtual Wesenschau and, at the same time, always already working in the intuition (or in the vision, or, more generally, in the apprehension) of this or that phenomenon" (carbone-2015-flesh-of-images, ch. 3).
Three-fold definition: voyance is the mode of art (how painting/poetry/film make-visible), the mode of access to Being (how the invisible is given in the visible), and the mode of knowing (a carnal Wesenschau that does not claim conceptual possession).
Seeing as Seconder: The Möbius Structure of Voyance
Carbone reads voyance as seconder: seeing as "seconding" the self-showing of the sensible. The French verb expresses the indistinguishability of activity and passivity. The Claudel title L'œil écoute (The Eye Listens) captures the same structure synesthetically: the eye that listens is the eye that lets-be rather than grasps, that seconds rather than subjects.
Klee's gegenständliche Jawort (matrimonial-"yes" to the object) — cited by MP from Klee's 1924 Jena lecture — is a further formulation of the same: the artist's acceptance-of-the-object is a letting-be indistinguishable from creating.
This is why voyance is also the structure of philosophy's "object": MP writes that the "thing itself" is "in principle apprehended in transparency […] by someone who wishes not to have them but to see them, not to hold them as with forceps, or to immobilize them as under the objective of a microscope, but to let them be" (V&I 101). The voyance is philosophical as well as pictorial.
Connections
- is the epistemic register of mutual precession — voyance names the gnoseology proper to a vision whose ontological structure is mutual precession
- is a species of fundamental-thought-in-art — voyance is specifically the visual mode of fundamental thought; painting thinks as voyance
- is what sensible-ideas are known by — sensible ideas are veiled with shadows and require voyance to be apprehended
- is the counter-concept to Heidegger's Vor-stellung — where Vor-stellung objectifies, voyance lets-be
- corrects Husserl's disembodied Wesenerschauung — MP V&I 116 critique
- parallels co-naissance — both name perceptual knowing as simultaneous birth of knower/known
- is exemplified by paul-klee and marcel-proust — Klee's Sichtbarmachen is voyance as painterly program; Proust's "faire voir par des mots" is voyance as literary program
- grounds philosophy-cinema — cinema (Bazin's "ontology of image") is a voyance-based art; so philosophy-cinema is a philosophy that takes voyance as its operating mode
- is what MP's late formula "making visible" names on the side of vision — making visible is what voyance does
Open Questions
- How does voyance relate to MP's earlier notion of motor intentionality (PhP)? Is voyance its specifically visual register, or a distinct structure?
- Is voyance restricted to aesthetic-philosophical experience, or does it characterize all perception? Carbone reads it as the general structure of vision; Rodrigo's reading (L'intentionnalité créatrice) leans toward the aesthetic-specific.
- What is the relationship between voyance and pregnancy / dehiscence? All three name a vision that opens onto more than it grasps; are they three names for one structure or distinct species?
- Does voyance survive the corrective move by which MP "reverses" phenomenology? Could there be a voyance of conceptual thinking, or is it essentially pre-conceptual?
Synthetic Claims
- live claim, see claims#letting-be-beneath-distinction — voyance is the gnoseological mode of letting-be: seeing as seconder (complying with) the self-showing of the sensible, structurally beneath the activity-passivity distinction. Per Carbone 2004 Ch 3 p. 33 + Ch 4 p. 41.
Sources
- carbone-2004-thinking-of-the-sensible — Ch 3 "Nature: Variations on the Theme," "Voyance" §, pp. 31–34, plus Ch 4 reprise. The foundational anchor on the wiki for voyance as the gnoseological register of MP's late ontology, predating Carbone 2015 by 7 years. The 2004 treatment introduces (a) the carnal Wesensschau framing; (b) the extension from painting to speech (Rimbaud, Claudel, Valéry, Saint-John Perse, Simon); (c) the synesthesia of voyance via Claudel's L'Œil écoute (the listening eye). The Flesh of Images (2015) treatment is a systematization of arguments first articulated here.
- carbone-2015-flesh-of-images — ch. 3 "Making Visible: Merleau-Ponty and Paul Klee," pp. 31–40. The most sustained treatment of voyance on the wiki: Rimbaud, Ernst, Klee, Leonardo, Baudelaire, Claudel; the "magical idea of visibility"; voyance as carnal Wesenschau; the three-fold convergence (art, Being, knowing). A development of the 2004 reading; see Carbone 2004 entry above.
- merleau-ponty-2022-possibility-of-philosophy — the 1960–61 course preparatory notes. Voyance appears pp. 175, 182–183, 186–187, 190 et passim. The term's natural habitat.
- merleau-ponty-1961-eye-and-mind — §4: the unique published occurrence of voyance (translated as "visualization"). "This precession of what is upon what one sees and makes seen… this is vision itself" — the voyance passage.
- merleau-ponty-1964-signs — Intro p. 20–21: "To see is as a matter of principle to see farther than one sees, to reach a latent existence. The invisible is the outline and the depth of the visible." This is MP's most public formulation of voyance's structure, though the word is not used here.