Anthropologisme

Per Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §2), Merleau-Ponty's anthropologisme is not the same as anthropologie. It is the negative humanism of the humanisme criticiste — Brunschvicg's "humanisme radical où tout est construit et tout est donné" — extended through Sartre and the Cartesian-Aristotelian tradition. The "anti-anthropological turn" reading of late MP (which interprets MP's recurrent "ce que je fais n'est pas une anthropologie mais une ontologie" as a Heideggerian reduction of the human) is a category error: anthropologisme refers to the negative humanism, while anthropologie (the empirical discipline) is precisely what MP praises in his October 1959 article De Mauss à Claude Lévi-Strauss.

Key Points

  • Anthropologisme ≠ Anthropology. This is the cardinal distinction Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §2) recovers from MP's published and unpublished corpus. The two are opposed, not synonymous.
  • The "anti-anthropological turn" reading of late MP is a category error. Per Saint Aubert: "Les remarques anti-anthropologiques du dernier Merleau-Ponty, au-delà de leur terreau protestataire initial, sont donc loin de servir une opposition manichéenne entre ontologie et anthropologie." MP's anti-anthropological formulae presuppose the positive anthropologie and target only the negative anthropologisme.
  • The negative anthropologisme is defined in PbPassiv (1955) and the 1957 Nature course as "humanisme radical où tout est construit et tout est donné" — i.e. Brunschvicg's "humanisme criticiste" extended to the Cartesian-Sartrean tradition. The 1957 Nature course adds Kant: "le sens anthropologique du renversement copernicien opéré par Kant" — Kant's transcendental humanism reposes Being on the human (Brunschvicg's reading).
  • MP praises positive anthropology in De Mauss à Claude Lévi- Strauss (October 1959, in Signes): "Ce qui intéresse le philosophe en elle, c'est précisément qu'elle prenne l'homme comme il est, dans sa situation effective de vie et de connaissance. Le philosophe qu'elle intéresse n'est pas celui qui veut expliquer ou construire le monde, mais celui qui cherche à approfondir notre insertion dans l'être."
  • The concentric circle of anti-anthropologisme: Brunschvicg (humanisme criticiste / kantien) → Sartre (existentialism's réalité-humaine) → Heidegger (per MP's reading, an "humanisme par dénégation de l'homme"). All three are anthropologistes in MP's late polemic; only positive anthropology (Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, Wallon, Schilder, Klein) escapes.
  • Per Saint Aubert: anthropologisme = ontologisme. The two are symmetric forms of refusal of the carnal-relational structure of human being. "Naturalisme, anthropologisme, déisme, ontologisme: par ces vocables, les manuscrits d'Être et Monde désignent autant de manières d'évacuer le mystère de l'être qui est enfermé dans la chair du sensible" (cited Saint Aubert 2006 Ch I §2).

Details

The 1955 emergence

Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §1c) anchors the term anthropologisme in the 1955 cours sur le problème de la passivité — the same cours that introduces "priorité ontologique du monde perçu." The two are coordinate moves: as the primat de la perception becomes priorité ontologique, the negative anthropologisme is identified by contrast with the new priorité. The same passages that introduce priorité ontologique introduce the protest "ce que je fais n'est pas une anthropologie mais une ontologie."

The 1957 Kant-Brunschvicg extension

The 1957 Nature course (RC57, in La Nature) extends anthropologisme to Kant's "renversement copernicien": the Kantian transcendental subject is "humanisme radical où tout est construit et tout est donné" — exactly Brunschvicg's reading of Kant in Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale (1927) and Les âges de l'intelligence (1934). Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §2): "C'est par ces mêmes mots que Merleau-Ponty a toujours caractérisé l'humanisme criticiste ou humanisme kantien de Brunschvicg, qui fait reposer la Nature sur l'homme et 'reposer l'Être sur l'homme'."

The litany of anti-anthropological formulae (1958-61)

Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §1c) collects MP's recurrent anti-anthropological formulae from late 1958 through March 1961:

"Cela ne veut, bien entendu, pas dire que nous soyons passés de la philosophie à la psychologie ou à l'anthropologie." (1958-59)

"Transformer mon esse est percipi en écartant toute équivoque psychologiste: il ne s'agit pas d'anthropologie, il s'agit de l'être brut ou sauvage." (1958-59)

"Quand nous parlons de la chair du visible, nous n'entendons pas faire de l'anthropologie, décrire un monde recouvert de toutes nos projections..." (V&I working note)

"Une philosophie de la chair est condition sans laquelle la psychanalyse reste anthropologie." (March 1961, V&I working note)

"Philosophie qui est non-philosophie = non théologie, non anthropologie, non positivisme."

"L'ontologie (...) par delà l'anthropologie." (1961)

The litany has "largement contribué à l'idée que l'ontologie du dernier Merleau-Ponty procéderait d'un 'tournant anti-anthropocentrique' de facture heideggérienne" (Saint Aubert 2006 Ch I §1c). Saint Aubert's correction: these formulae are not a Heideggerian reduction; they target the negative anthropologisme (Brunschvicg-Sartre-Kant) while presupposing positive anthropologie.

The October 1959 De Mauss à Lévi-Strauss as the corrective text

The decisive corrective: in October 1959 — at the very heart of the late ontological-anti-anthropological period — MP publishes De Mauss à Claude Lévi-Strauss in Signes. The text "fait l'éloge des virtualités philosophiques et ontologiques de l'anthropologie, en démarquant celle-ci de la pensée explicative" (Saint Aubert 2006).

"Ce qui intéresse le philosophe en elle [l'anthropologie], c'est précisément qu'elle prenne l'homme comme il est, dans sa situation effective de vie et de connaissance. Le philosophe qu'elle intéresse n'est pas celui qui veut expliquer ou construire le monde, mais celui qui cherche à approfondir notre insertion dans l'être."

The October 1959 text aligns positive anthropology (Mauss, Lévi- Strauss) with MP's own project ("approfondir notre insertion dans l'être") and separates it from the "pensée explicative" that names the negative anthropologisme.

The Brunschvicg-Sartre-Kant axis

Per Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §2), the negative anthropologisme has three canonical instantiations:

  1. Brunschvicg's humanisme criticiste — the proximate target from 1933 onwards. "Tout est construit et tout est donné": the transcendental subject reposes Being on the human, then constructs Being from the human's powers.
  2. Kant's renversement copernicien, as read by Brunschvicg — not Kant himself but the Brunschvicg-mediated reading. Per Saint Aubert, MP "peut paraître excessif d'affecter ainsi à Kant le visage d'un humanisme prétendant tout expliquer et tout construire" but the target is the Brunschvicg-shaped Kant, not the historical Kant.
  3. Sartre's réalité-humaine — the existentialist humanism that makes human freedom the absolute. Per the V&I (1958 working note): "Cette manière de penser n'est-elle pas la seule (à partir du néant) dès que nous sommes libres? Non: c'est là la racine de l'anthropologisme de Descartes et de Sartre. Et c'en est l'erreur."

Anthropologisme = Ontologisme

Saint Aubert (2006 Ch I §2) recovers the structurally important MP formula: "[anthropologisme], dès qu'on l'interroge lui-même sur son sens, se révèle comme une forme aiguë d'ontologisme, ou une philosophie dogmatique des données immédiates" (V&I working note). The two are symmetric:

  • Anthropologisme: makes the human the donné on which Being reposes.
  • Ontologisme: makes Being the donné on which the human reposes.

Both refuse the carnal-relational empiétement that MP names the primary fact: that the human and Being are co-born (co-naissance) and neither stands as the immediate donné.

What the Concept Does

Five argumentative jobs:

  1. It corrects the Heideggerianizing reading of late MP. MP's anti-anthropological formulae do not reduce the human to Being; they target the negative humanism (Brunschvicg-Sartre-Kant) while presupposing positive anthropology.
  2. It identifies the structural symmetry of anthropologisme and ontologisme. Both are "philosophies dogmatiques des données immédiates" that refuse the empiétement.
  3. It anchors MP's late ontology in the 1933 anti-Brunschvicg formation. The negative anthropologisme is the same target MP has worked since the 1930s; the late "anti-anthropologisme" is not a new turn but the surfacing of an old polemic.
  4. It distinguishes positive anthropology (Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, Wallon, Klein, Schilder) from negative anthropologisme. Positive anthropology is non-philosophical in the MP sense (cf. non-philosophie) — it works the empirical with which philosophy must engage in empiétement.
  5. It enables MP's reading of L'Œil et l'Esprit and the V&I as continuous with positive anthropology. Far from a reduction of the human, late MP's "ontology" is the deepening of "notre insertion dans l'être" — exactly the formula MP applies to positive anthropology in De Mauss à Lévi-Strauss.

What It Rejects

  • Brunschvicg's "humanisme criticiste." "Tout est construit et tout est donné" — the transcendental subject's all-power-and-all-passivity.
  • Kant's reading by Brunschvicg. The Kantian transcendental reposing Being on the human as the immediate donné.
  • Sartre's "réalité-humaine." Existentialist humanism's positing of human freedom as absolute origin.
  • The Cartesian-cartographic anthropologism. "L'anthropologisme de Descartes et de Sartre" (V&I working note).
  • The Heideggerian "humanisme par dénégation de l'homme." Per Saint Aubert (2006 Ch III §2b), Heidegger's anti-humanism is itself a symmetric refusal — the human reduced to "berger de l'être" "non par une vertu positive et sienne" but by being placed under Being's domain.

Stakes

If anthropologisme is the negative humanism (not anthropology), three things change:

First, late MP's "ontological turn" is not a Heideggerian reduction of the human. The litany "ce que je fais n'est pas une anthropologie mais une ontologie" is structurally the same polemic MP has run since 1933 — against Brunschvicg, Sartre, and Kant-as-read-by-Brunschvicg — under a slightly different vocabulary.

Second, positive anthropology is constitutive of MP's late ontology, not an obstacle to it. De Mauss à Lévi-Strauss (October 1959) is the structural counterpart of the V&I working notes, not their contradiction.

Third, MP's relation to Heidegger is reframed: Heidegger's "anti- humanism" is, in MP's reading, itself a form of anthropologisme — a refusal of the carnal-relational structure of human being via the deferral of the chair (cf. Saint Aubert 2006 Ch V on Heidegger's Sein und Zeit and the Zollikoner Seminare).

Problem-Space

Anthropologisme articulates a recurring problem: how should philosophy treat the human in its relation to Being, neither making the human the immediate donné that supports Being (idealist humanism) nor making Being the immediate donné that supports the human (Heideggerian anti-humanism)?

The classical attempts:

  1. Brunschvicg's humanisme criticiste: the transcendental subject is the immediate donné from which Being is constructed.
  2. Kant's transcendental anthropology: the subject's powers constitute the structure of Being-for-us.
  3. Sartre's existentialism: human freedom is absolute origin; Being is the En-soi the For-itself encounters.
  4. Heidegger's "humanisme par dénégation": Being is the immediate donné; the human is placed under it as berger.

MP's answer (per Saint Aubert 2006): refuse the donné on either side. The human and Being are co-born (co-naissance); the carnal- relational empiétement (empietement) is the proper object of ontology; positive anthropology — Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, Wallon, Klein, Schilder — is the empirical-philosophical site at which the empiétement becomes visible.

Connections

  • contrasts with anthropologie (the empirical discipline) — the cardinal distinction.
  • is symmetric with ontologisme — both refuse the empiétement; the former makes the human immediate donné, the latter makes Being.
  • targets Brunschvicg's "humanisme criticiste."
  • targets Kant as read by Brunschvicg — not the historical Kant.
  • targets Sartre's existentialism — "anthropologisme de Descartes et de Sartre."
  • applies to Heidegger as anti-humanism — per Saint Aubert (2006 Ch III §2b), Heidegger's "humanisme par dénégation de l'homme" is a symmetric anthropologisme.
  • contrasts with the positive anthropology of *De Mauss à Lévi-Strauss* (October 1959).
  • contrasts with MP's own non-philosophie — anthropology as non-philosophical empiétement is welcome; anthropologisme as refusal of empiétement is refused.
  • is presupposed by the 1955 priorité ontologique du monde perçu protest (cf. primacy-of-perception).
  • is overcome by co-naissance — the co-birth of the human and Being that refuses both anthropologisme and ontologisme.

Open Questions

  • Is the Brunschvicg-mediated Kant the only Kant in MP? Saint Aubert (2006) emphasizes the Brunschvicg-mediated reading. But MP's late references to Kant (e.g., the Critique of Judgment readings in 1955-58) suggest a more nuanced relation. Whether MP's late Kant is exclusively the Brunschvicg-shaped Kant remains open.
  • How does anthropologisme relate to MP's earlier rejection of Réalité humaine? The 1958 V&I working note ("contre l'humanisme de la réalité-humaine: il y a un préhumain dans l'homme et un plus qu'humain") echoes earlier MP texts. The continuity is clear; the periodization could be sharpened.
  • Is the Heidegger-as-anthropologisme reading internally consistent? Saint Aubert (2006) reads Heidegger's "humanisme par dénégation" as a form of anthropologisme; this is a strong reading that some Heidegger scholars (e.g., Marlène Zarader) would contest.

Synthetic Claims

The synthetic interpretive layer (wiki/claims.md) articulates one live claim for which this page is a Wiki home. Live claims may be cited from concept pages with provisional framing per CLAUDE.md §Claims Register Format.

  • live claim, see claims#anthropologisme-vs-anthropologie-distinction — the "anti-anthropological turn" reading of late MP is a category error: anthropologisme (negative humanism — Brunschvicg's "humanisme criticiste" extended to Sartre and Kant-as-read-by-Brunschvicg) is not the same as anthropologie (the empirical discipline MP praises in October 1959 De Mauss à Claude Lévi-Strauss as "ce qu'il y a de plus concret dans sa méthode" for "approfondir notre insertion dans l'être"). Heideggerianizing readings of late MP that equate the "anti-anthropological" formula with a reduction of the human to the question of Being miss this distinction. Anchored in SA-2006 Ch I §2 with raw-line references for the rejection-formula in MP's own voice (raw 681) and the anthropologisme definition (raw 679). The claim consolidates the page's central thesis at the synthetic-layer register.

Sources