Nelson Goodman

American philosopher (1906–1998), exponent of analytic aesthetics and constructive nominalism. His Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (1968; 2nd ed. 1976) develops a denotational/symbolic theory of pictorial representation: a picture represents what it denotes, not what it resembles. Goodman's framework treats pictures as symbol-systems with syntactic and semantic properties (density, repleteness, exemplification) characteristic of their representational mode. The view rejects resemblance theories of representation — pictures of the same object can be radically dissimilar; dissimilar things can both depict the same object — and grounds pictorial reference in learned conventions of symbol-system interpretation.

In Taddio 2025 Goodman is cited as one of the two principal rejected picture-theory rivals (the other being Gombrich's resemblance-and-schema account). Taddio's anti-Goodman move: representation cannot be grounded in denotation because denotation operates on already-functional images, while the conditions of image-being — the phenomenal-invariants that make any visual mark count as showing something — are pre-symbolic and pre-conventional. The closing argument of Taddio §8: "The nature of representation does not lie in resemblance, nor, as Goodman argued, in denotation. Rather, the representation of a thing replaces the thing itself in the sense that it recreates it: the image participates in the same rules of 'givenness' as the object."

Goodman's Position (As Engaged by Taddio)

Goodman's central claims, as relevant to Taddio:

  • Resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation: pictures represent through denotation, which is a relation in a symbol-system, not a similarity relation.
  • Representation is symbol-system-relative: what a picture represents depends on the conventions of the symbol-system to which it belongs.
  • Pictorial symbol-systems are dense and replete: small differences along multiple dimensions are semantically significant, distinguishing pictures from notational systems.
  • Realism is conventional: a "realistic" picture is one in the system in which interpretation is standard for the viewer; realism is not a measure of objective fidelity.

Taddio does not engage Goodman's full positive program (the dense/replete account, exemplification, etc.); the engagement is restricted to Goodman as the standard-bearer of denotation against which Taddio's phenomenal-invariant account is positioned.

Taddio's Counterargument

Taddio's anti-Goodman move runs as follows:

  1. Denotation requires already-functional images — images that can be interpreted as denoting because they already operate as visual configurations.
  2. The conditions under which marks become functional images — figure-ground, principles of unification, amodal completion, transparency conditions, depth cues — operate at a level prior to convention. They are phenomenal-organizational, not symbolic-conventional.
  3. Therefore the explanatory base of pictorial representation is not denotation but the field of phenomenal invariants.
  4. Resemblance, when it occurs, is a consequence of shared invariants, not the foundation of representation. Goodman is right to reject resemblance as foundational; he is wrong to substitute denotation, which is also downstream of phenomenal organization.

The argument's strength: it answers Goodman's "resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient" by locating the foundational level below both resemblance and denotation. The argument's weakness: Taddio's restricted domain (figurative painting — Cézanne, Magritte, Escher) does not engage Goodman's primary cases (diagrams, maps, perspectival notation). The paper may be talking past Goodman rather than refuting him.

Position on the Wiki

This entity is created primarily to anchor the competing position Taddio rejects. The wiki's broader engagement with Goodman is thin: Goodman has not been ingested as a primary source, and the resemblance-vs-denotation debate is not otherwise represented. Future ingests of Wollheim, Hopkins, Walton, or contemporary picture-theory literature would deepen the position.

Connections

  • rejected by Taddio as foundational theorist of pictorial representation; Languages of Art is a principal rival to the phenomenal-invariants account.
  • paralleled by Gombrich as the other principal rival picture-theorist (resemblance vs. denotation are paired rivals).
  • contrasts with phenomenal-invariants account: denotation operates on already-functional images; phenomenal invariants are what makes images functional.
  • contrasts with *système d'équivalences* account: representation as conventional denotation vs. representation as shared phenomenal organization.
  • adjacent to but distinct from MP's pre-conventional account of expression — both anti-resemblance, but Goodman remains within a symbol-system framework MP would reject.

Sources

  • taddio-2025-art-and-psychology — Goodman cited at §2 (briefly) and §8 (as the principal rejected position).
  • Indirect via Taddio: Goodman 1976 Languages of Art, 2nd ed. (Bobbs-Merrill). Not ingested as primary source.